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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Purpose 
This dissertation uses public finance theory and econometrics to examine the variation of 
expenditures on public higher education among states. The basic theory of public goods and 
externalities combined with comparative static analysis provides the theoretical framework to 
examine the effect of possible explanatory variables on optimal subsidy levels for public higher 
education. Two theoretical models are developed, a one sector model of the higher education 
market that treats private education as independent of the public market, and a two sector model 
that recognizes the interdependence of the public and private markets for higher education. Cross-
sectional regression techniques are then used to determine the relative importance of differences in 
the explanatory variables on the optimal subsidy levels and to test the usefulness of separating the 
two higher education markets. One of the most significant findings is that states react to the vested 
interest they have in educating their citizens. Variables that influence future state government 
income are consistently significant in determining the optimal per-student public subsidy. This 
supports the argument that governments' behavior is affected by their equity interest in the 
educational investment of their citizens. Another significant finding is that state support of private 
higher education appears to decrease allocations to public higher education. 
Dissertation Organization 
Chapter 2 re\iews previous empirical studies on state expenditures for higher education. These 
studies provide a starting point for theoretical analysis of state support of public higher education as 
developed in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 describes the theoretical foundation for a one-sector treatment of state support of 
public higher education. This chapter treats private higher education as essentially exogenous to the 
public higher education market in a state and uses comparative static analysis to provide insight 
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about the effects of changes or differences in the explanatory variables on the public higher 
education subsidy. 
Chapter 4 describes the data used for the empirical models. 
Chapter S outlines the empirical models implied by the theory m Chapter 3. These models are 
tested using linear regression techniques and conclusions are drawn based on the regression results. 
Chapter 6 builds upon the higher education model in Chapter 3 by including the private higher 
education market in a two sector model of the higher education market in a state. In this section, 
private higher education is treated as endogenous to the model. Comparative static analysis is again 
employed to determine the effect of changes or differences in the explanatory variables on the 
optimal state subsidy for public higher education within the two-sector framework. 
Chapter 7 includes the empirical models implied by the two sector theory developed in Chapter 
6 and the conclusions that can be drawn from the results of the regression procedure. 
Chapter 8 presents general conclusions from the previous chapters. The References, 
Acknowledgements and Appendices follow. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The expense of the institutions for education and religious instruction, is likewise, no doubt, 
beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without injustice, be defrayed by the general 
contribution of the whole society." (Adam Smith) 
"All that is spent during many years in opening the means of higher education to the masses 
would be well paid for if it called out one more Newton or Darwin, Shakespeare or Beethoven." 
(Alfred Marshdl) 
It has long been recognized that investment in higher education by society is a necessary and 
beneficial endeavor. The rationale for government involvement is based on three arguments. One, 
there are imperfections in the market for higher education, specifically in the acquisition of flnancing 
for students. Since indentured servitude is illegal, students have difficulty securing loans for human 
capital investment because the lender has no collateral in case of default. The second argument for 
government involvement in the higher education market is that there are imperfections in the flow of 
information to students and their families. The result of this imperfection is that students simply 
lack the foresight to make efficient decisions about the long-term payoff versus short-run costs of 
higher education. The third justification is that there exist external benefits that accrue to society 
from the education of its members and these render the level of private investment inadequate 
(Wiseman, in Psacharopoulos, 1987). Subsidies, by all levels of government, have therefore been 
implemented in order to capture these benefits. How these subsidy amounts are determined is a 
question that has inspired three decades of research. In particular, there have been several studies 
of the variation among states' higher education appropriations, based on the research of Soloman 
Fabricant. 
Fabricant, in his 1952 research, attempted to explain using regression analysis the primary 
determinants of per-capita state and local general expenditures. He found that per capita income, 
percent urban population and population density explained 72 percent of the variation in general 
state expenditures for 1942. Fabricant also examined specific expenditure categories such as local 
schools and highways but did not address higher education specifically. This preliminary study led 
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the way to more detailed analysis which included higher education expenditures, beginning with the 
work of Glenn Fisher. 
Fisher, in his 1961 study, used multiple regression analysis to identify the "more important 
quantifiable factors and to present the 'unexplained' variations in such a form as to in^te further 
analysis of both quantifiable and non-quantifiable influences" (Fisher, 1961). He used the 
explanatory variables of Fabricant (income, degree of urbanization and population density) to 
analyze state and local government expenditure data pro\ided by the 1957 Census of Governments. 
In his study he estimated equations to determine expected expenditures for states and then 
compared the estimated and actual expenditures to discover the extent to which omitted variables 
influence expenditures. 
Fisher found a coefficient of multiple correlation of .61 for his regression equation for higher 
education expenditure. The estimating equation showed that the Only positive influence on higher 
education expenditures was per capita income. 
In a 1964 study, Fisher attempted to explain a greater percentage of the variation of state 
expenditures and to indicate the relative importance of the variables studied. He again used 
regression analysis, and to demonstrate relative importance, computed multiple partial coefficients. 
Fisher's original list of 12 explanatory variables was grouped into three categories: economic, 
demographic, and socio-political. 
Fisher computed the multiple correlation coefficients with all 12 independent variables and 
numerous combinations until he arrived at the combination that resulted in the highest coefficient 
with the least number of variables. The seven included in the detailed analysis were the following. 
1. Percent of families with incomes less than $2000 in 1959 (XI), 
2. yield of representative tax system, 1960, as percent of U.S. average (X2), 
3. population per square mile in 1960 (X3), 
4. percent of population in urban areas in 1%0 (X4), 
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5. percent increase in population from 1950 to 1960 (XS), 
6. Fenton's Index of two party competition (X6), and 
7. percent of population over 25 with less than 5 years of schooling in 1960 (XT). 
Fenton's Index was devised to test the hypothesis that two party competitiveness leads to 
government action on behalf of the less well-off in a state. 
The seven variables incorporated in this analysis had a multiple coefficient of determination, R^ 
of .59 for the regression equation for state and local expenditures on higher education. This was an 
improvement over the of .42 for the original three variables in the 1961 inquiry. Population per 
square mile, percent urban population, and percent of adults with less than five years schooling all 
were found to negatively influence higher education expenditures. Expenditures were positively 
influenced by percent of families with less than $2000 incomes, tax yield, increase in population, and 
two party competition. 
At the same time Fisher was adding to his original analysis of higher education expenditures, 
Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris were testing the importance of federal and state aid in explaining 
the variation of per capita spending between states. They did not address the issue of higher 
education specifically but rather included it in a "catch-all" category. 
Sacks and Harris noted that the coefficients of multiple determination, R^ in Fisher's two 
analyses had declined in many of the individual regression equations when compared to Fabricant's 
study. They felt this was due to the increasing importance of intergovernmental flows of funds and 
proceeded to test this hypothesis by using stepwise regression techniques. 
The inclusion of federal aid to states as an independent variable was justified by Sacks and 
Harris because "federal aid can be regarded as ' outside money' from the point of view of the state 
and local government, and its availability should be expected to have a direct impact on raising state 
and local expenditure levels" (Sacks and Harris, p. 79). As Fisher notes though, results of studies 
that include federal aid must be interpreted with care because in the most extreme example, federal 
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matching programs will have a correlation of 1.0 with state expenditures and therefore cannot be 
considered as truly independent variables. 
State aid was included as an independent variable to test the idea that it would lead to an 
increase in state and local expenditures combined. The issue of whether state and federal aid are in 
a sense the same variable was dismissed under the hypothesis that federal aid passed on from states 
to local governments would have a distmct expenditure e^ect compared to state aid to local 
governments and federal aid to state governments. Higher education was included in the "Not 
Specifically Aided and All Other" category, therefore no conclusions could be made about the effect 
of the two aid variables on expenditures except that they should be considered in future analyses. 
Roy Bahl, Jr. and Robert Saunders included federal aid in their study of determining what 
factors influence changes in state and local government expenditures as opposed to what influences 
the magnitude of expenditures. Bahl and Saunders used multiple correlation analysis to discover 
how influential are changes in the independent variables when explaining changes in per capita 
general expenditures and per capita expenditures by function. The five explanatory variables used 
were: 
1. change in per capita income, 
2. change in population density, 
3. change in urban population, 
4. change in federal grants, and 
5. change in public school enrollment. 
The first three variables were employed by Fabricant in his 1952 study. The fourth was considered 
relevant due to the Sacks and Harris study. The flnal variable, public school enrollment, was 
included as a measure of the relative importance of educational expenditures in the total state and 
local budget. 
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The Ave variables explained 56 percent of the variation in higher education expenditures among 
the 48 states, with changes in urban population accounting for more than half of the variation. This 
result was even more pronounced when considering IS high income, high density states alone. In 
that case, changes in urban population explained 79 percent of the variation in higher education 
expenditures. This is significant since the five variables together explain 89 percent of the variation 
in higher education expenditures. 
In 1969 M. Charles Mclntyre designed a model to look at interstate variations in public higher 
education expenditures; it included variables external to the institution as well as internal variables. 
Mclntyre especially wanted to examine the effect of funding sourcc differences among three types of 
public institutions; universities, four-year colleges, and two-year junior colleges. 
Mclntyre employed the following model and ran regressions based on it for the alternative 
institution types. 
E= f(SAT.I) where; 
E = reported expenditure levels per student for instruction, 
S = description of student enrollment by class level and extent of full-time attendance, 
A = general flnancial ability of the state to support public higher education, 
T = index measuring tax effort for public higher education, and 
I = relative utilization of different types of income sources. 
The student enrollment variable, S, was included on the hypothesis that institutions that enroll 
primarily graduate students would be expected to have higher expenditure per student due to smaller 
class size, fewer teaching units per faculty, and possibly higher average faculty salaries. The variable 
S also incorporates the extent of full-time versus part-time attendance because it is probable that 
costs differ between the two. The first partial derivative of E with respect to S is expected to be 
positive. 
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Variable A, the ability of the state to finance public higher education, is in terms of personal 
income per capita but Mclntyre acknowledges that a more relevant measure would look at such 
factors as age distribution, natural resources, geographical location and distribution of the population 
between urban and rural areas. This is very difficult to apply in practice so he deferred to the 
traditional measure. The first partial derivative of E with respect to A is also expected to be positive 
since it is likely that wealthier states, ceteris paribus, would spend more for higher education than 
less wealthy states. 
Tax effort, T, is the amount of tax revenue raised for higher education relative to total personal 
income. This is corrected for population differences to ^ve an idea of the relative value of the 
resources given up to the public sector by a citizen. The effect of tax effort on the expenditure 
function is expected to be positive. 
The variable I describes the possible income sources and their relative importance to the 
expenditure function. This variable encompasses tuition, fees, state aid and local government aid. 
The sign of the derivative of expenditures with respect to income sources is ambiguous since reliance 
on a particular type of income is not indicative of higher or lower expenditures per student by 
institutions. 
Mclntyre conducted an empirical test and found that his model explained 50 percent of the 
variation between states in instructional expenditures and almost 80 percent of the variation in 
expenditures in four-year public colleges. 
Mclntyre found that in the university expenditure regression, all but two variables were 
significant at the one percent level. Type of degree granted and tax effort appeared to have little 
impact on university instructional spending per student. The results for the different types of income 
showed that reliance on one type of income source did not seem to affect variation in expenditures 
when adjusted for student characteristics, state fmancial ability and tax effort. Interestingly, 
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Mclntyre determined from correlation coefficients that increases in tuition did not act as a substitute 
for state tax support; rather, they were more than matched by increases in state aid. 
Further advances in explaining higher education expenditure variations were made by Robert 
Peterson. His study of the determinants of state higher education appropriations in 1976 included 20 
socioeconomic, institutional environment, and political variables, many not used in previous analyses. 
Peterson divided the dependent variables, per-capita and per-student appropriations for 1960 
and 1969, into three categories based on institutional type: four-year and above public institutions, 
two-year public institutions and all public institutions of higher education. The socioeconomic 
independent variables considered were the following. 
1. Ho^erbert's industrialization factor scores, 
2. Hofferbert's affluence factor scores, 
3. personal income per capita, 
4. corporate income per capita, 
5. median years of school completed by population (25 years or older), 
6. percent of population 25 years and older that is college educated, 
7. Percent of population of college age (18 to 22). 
The two factor scores of Hofferbert are indexes that are derived from a number of weighted 
variables. The industrialization score is influenced by such things as manufacturing employment, 
population density, urban population, value of farm property and other less apparent variables such 
as telephones. The affluence factor score is comprised of such variables as median school years, real 
property values, personal income, illiteracy, telephones and motor vehicles. This factor is strongly 
affected by wealth and educational attainment of the population and is expected to influence a state's 
demand for education. 
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The two income measures and the two education measures are expected to positively affect 
appropriations because it is likely that wealthier, educated populations have a stronger motivation to 
support higher education. 
The percent of college-age population, preferences for private versus public schooling constant, 
is also expected to positively influence the demand for higher education. 
The institutional environment variables were the following. 
8. All public institution enrollment per 10,000 population, 
9. public junior college enrollment per 10,000 population, 
10. public senior institution enrollment per 10,000 population, 
11. all private higher education enrollment per 10,000 population, 
12. number of private institutions per one million population, 
13. public institution students (in state or out of state) as a percent of all college student state 
residents, and 
14. advanced degree work as a percent of public enrollment. 
The enrollment measures are included to determine their impact upon policy decisions. 
Number of private institutions is included based on the idea that they have the potential to pressure 
policy makers for their own needs. The percent of all college students attending public institutions is 
included to reflect the public - private bias of the state, with the idea that a state more oriented 
towards private higher education is less apt to devote many resources to public higher education. 
Finally, advanced degree work is included, as in the Mclntyre study, to determine whether this 
results in higher appropriations due to the greater expense entailed. 
The six political measures incorporated in the study are the following. 
15. Sharkansky and Hofferbert's professionalism-local reliance factor scores, 
16. Sharkansky and Hofferberl's competition-turnout factor scores, 
17. Schlesinger's combined index of governor's powers. 
11 
18. Francis' index of centralization in decision-making, 
19. McCrone and Cnudde's anti-discrimination index, 
20. Walker's innovation scores. 
The Sharkansky and Hofferbert professionalism-local reliance factor was designed to indicate 
state legislative professionalism as well as reliance on state and federal funds versus local funds. It is 
hypothesized that professional legislators would likely develop the highest level of public services 
attainable as opposed to amateur legislators. The competition-turnout factor was developed to 
measure interparty competition and voter turnout. States with high competition-turnout factor 
scores are expected to have higher public spending. 
The index of governor's powers was included on the premise that a governor with strong 
powers would likely favor higher education. Francis' index of centralized decision making is 
incorporated to test political leadership roles in general. The anti-discrimination index measures the 
support of civil rights in a state and may influence appropriations positively or negatively depending 
on ci>dl rights attitudes and the extent that legislators perceive colleges to be influential in this area. 
Lastly, the innovation score was included with the idea that if public higher education institutions are 
seen as contributors to innovative ideas, they may gain or lose depending upon a state's tendency 
towards innovation. 
Peterson used correlation coefficients and regression analysis to measure the significance and 
importance of the preceding 20 variables in determining state appropriations for higher education. 
The leading socioeconomic variable affecting per capita appropriations was educational attainment of 
the population. The affluence factor yielded almost identical results, which is understandable since 
educational attainment is the most highly weighted component of the factor. An interesting result 
for the senior institution sector was that median school years was significant while the percent 
college educated was not, and both were significant for the junior college sector. Peterson suggests 
that "this may reflect a higher level of confidence by college educated parents that their childrens' 
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needs will be fulfilled by existing four year college opportunities and a preference for the junior 
college option for 'other' peoples children" (Peterson, p. 531). 
The only significant negative relationship found was between per-capita appropriations and the 
industrialization index. Peterson notes that this may be due to the strong relationship between 
private college orientation and industry and that the negativity is really due to the influence of 
private college orientation. 
Personal income and percent of college-age population did not emerge as significant 
determinants of per-capita appropriations for either 1960 or 1969 but personal income did influence 
per-student expenditures for senior institutions. 
Median years of schooling and affluence affected per-student expenditures positively but were 
weaker in their influence on per-capita spending in 1960. In 1969 they were insignificant. Percent of 
the population college-aged was significant in both 1960 and 1969 for per-student spending but not 
for per-capita results. The author determined that the increased influence of college-aged population 
supports the hypothesis that private school orientation no longer negatively affects financial support 
of students enrolled in public universities. 
The public enrollment variables exhibit the strongest effects on per-capita appropriations for 
the relevant institution types. As would be expected, enrollment in senior institutions has the 
greatest effect on appropriations for senior institutions per capita for 1960 and 1969. This 
relationship, positive and quite strong, b )ds for all of the enrollment variables and institution types. 
The private enrollment and private college variables are also significant for per-capita spending 
for the two years examined and, not surprisingly, are negative. This negativity declined between 
1960 and 1969 and is likely due to the growth in the demand for higher education and increased 
pressure for greater accessibility in the 1960s. 
When comparing per-student spending to per-capita spending, the results are decidedly 
different. The public enrollment variables almost all become insignificant and those that are 
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significant change signs and negatively influence expenditures. Peterson notes that the end of the 
60s saw states with large public sectors declining relatively in subsidization, having possibly reached 
their upper limits. 
As in Mclntyre's analysis, percent of advanced degree work was insignificant in both per-capita 
and per-student models. The author suggests that the greater cost of graduate education must come 
at the expense of other education levels. 
The political variables mcluded in the study were found to have some influence on state 
spending. The competition-turnout variable was significant for per capita appropriations for all 
public and senior public institutions. This supports the hypothesis that interparty competition leads 
to greater expenditure levels and is in agreement with Fisher's 1964 results. 
The professionalism-local reliance results are mixed but the author states that since it is 
significantly positive in 1969 for per-student spending in senior institutions, this implies that a 
professional legislature is likely to support high per-student subsidization. 
Peterson's study extended previous analyses of higher education appropriations and yielded 
many interesting results. The most significant finding according to him was that the institutional 
environment variables were the most important in explaining state spending. That is, in states with 
higher enrollment per capita, there were signiflcantly higher appropriations. 
The aforementioned five studies have made great advances in determining what influences 
government support of higher education and the level of expenditures allocated for instructional 
purposes. The following chapters of this dissertation build upon these previous studies by providing 
a theoretical basis for comparing interstate variation in support of higher education. The theory of 
externalities is employed to justify the inclusion of the variables used in the empirical models, some 
of which were included in earlier works. The theory also identifies some variables not considered in 
previous studies. 
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CHAPTER 3. ONE-SECTOR MODEL OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
A Theoretical Model 
The theory of externalities can be used to depict the nature of public higher education. 
Consider the diagram in Figure 1. 
The private demand curve, Dg, is the horizontal summation of the individuals' demands for 
public higher education. This is continuous in the aggregate even though at any given price an 
individual will make an all-or-nothing decision about investing in education. reflects the amount 
of public education privately demanded in a state by its' citizens at various tuition prices. 
The pseudo public demand curve for public higher education, PVEB (Present Value of 
External Benefits), is the public valuation of the present and future external benefits from education. 
PVEB is the vertical summation of the representative individual's valuation of the external benefits, 
IVEB. Apparently, PVEB is located everywhere above the private demand curve because at any 
enrollment level, tuition is typically less than the expenditure by government. In 1987-1988, tuition 
was 18.8 percent of the $47 billion four-year public institution revenue while state and local 
government contributions constituted 53 percent (State Higher Education Profiles). 
$ 
PVEB 
IVEB 
Enrollment Q Q 
Figure 1: Market Equilibrium with Externalities 
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The two demand curves, and PVEB, can be summed vertically to arrive at the total demand 
curve for public higher education in a state, Dg. This demand curve interacts with the supply curve 
for public higher education, S^, to determine the optimal tuition, subsidy and quantity, S', and 
Qb' respectively. Clearly, the private amount of public higher education that would be purchased, Q, 
is suboptimal if there are marginally relevant positive externalities; these give rise to the need for 
some type of subsidization. There are several measures of subsidies that can be calculated, as 
portrayed by the diagram in Figure 2. 
$ 
PVEB 
IVEB 
Enrollment Qe 
Figure 2: Alternative Subsidy Measures for Public Higher Education 
The subsidy needed to achieve the optimal enrollment level can be determined by the height of 
the public demand schedule PVEB at Q^'. Alternatively, it is the vertical distance between and 
Dg at Qe'. This subsidy corresponds to the annual per-student subsidy, S3, allocated by the state. 
Multiplying Sj by enrollment gives the total amount of a state's annual appropriations to public 
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higher education, S4. On a smaller scale, the height of IVEB at Qq* reflects the amount that the 
representative citizen is mlling to contribute per student, Sj, to enjoy the external benefits. 
Multiplying by total enrollment gives the annual per- citizen subsidy to public higher education, Sj. 
Consider the following example of 1988 expenditures for Iowa. The Iowa legislature 
appropriated $369,579,126 for public university support. This Hgure can be considered as the 
equivalent of S4 if appropriations are based on this theoretical analysis. Enrollment in the three 
universities was 59,030 fUl-time-equivalent students. The annual per-student subsidy, S3, would then 
amount to $6,260.86. Iowa's population in 1988 was 2,834,000. The per-capita subsidy to public 
higher education, S2, was $130.40 and the per-capita, per-student subsidy amount, S|, was $0.0022 
(Statistical Abstract of the United States; State Higher Education Profiles; IPEDS). 
The level of these subsidies depends upon the location of the supply and demand schedules for 
public higher education in each state and the valuation of the external benefits. The external 
benefits curve however, is a function of total enrollment and is therefore dependent upon both 
private and public higher education enrollments. In this section of the theory, the private higher 
education market will be considered as exogenous. The relationship between the two markets will 
be explored in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
The determinants of the schedules in the preceding figures have been examined in previous 
works and will be discussed in the analysis, with the emphasis on those variables expected to vary 
across states. The following have been identified as potentially influential. 
1. Percent of population college-aged. 
2. Average educational attainment. 
3. Per-capita income. 
4. Population. 
5. Percent urban population. 
6. Population density. 
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7. Expected increase in real after-tax future earnings resulting from a college education. 
8. Foregone earnings while attending college. 
9. Marginal tax rate. 
10. Migration. 
11. Grants, contributions, endowment income, federal aid. 
12. Percent junior college enrollment. 
13. Private school orientation. 
14. State aid to private schools. 
Many of the explanatory variables affect more than one curve. Explanations of how and why 
these affect the respective curves will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent pages. The private 
demand curve for public education, Dg, is considered here to be a function of the following 
independent variables: percent of the population college-aged, average educational attainment, per-
capita income, population, population density, expected increase in real after-tax future earnings, 
foregone earnings, marginal tax rate, private school orientation, and state aid to private institutions. 
PVEB, the present value of external benefits curve, is mfluenced by the following variables: 
average educational attainment, per-capita income, population, percent urban population, population 
density, expected increase in real after-tax future earnings, foregone earnings, marginal tax rate, 
migration, private school orientation and state aid to private institutions. 
The supply curve for public education, S^, is affected by the following: per-capita income, 
percent urban population, grants, contributions, endowment income and federal aid, and junior 
college enrollment. 
Figure 3 and equations 1-6 describe an equilibrium. 
n 
(1) PVEB. - a<?£ with A ~ I 
i=l 
n 
(2) P^-B-bQ^ withB-J^y^X, 
1=1 
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n 
(5) P I - C  *  c Q g  w i t h  c ~ Y ^ e , x ,  
»=1 
where A, B, C, a, b, c, a', 7^, and 6i are parameters, Qq is enrolhnent, is tuition, S is the per-
student subsidy and the X^s are the explanatory variables. The intercepts. A, B, and C depend on 
several factors which are expected to vary across states. Differences or changes in these factors will 
be represented by shifts in the intercepts of the schedules. The equilibrium condition is: + S = 
P s 
A+B 
PVEB 
Enrollment Q. 
Figure 3: Equilibrium in the Public Higher Education Market 
The optimal solutions are: 
S' = A - B -Q 
a b * c 
(5) p- = B ^ ^ -O 
a * b + c 
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(6) 
a + b + c 
S' is the optimal per-student subsidy and Pe' is the optimal tuition price to charge to students when 
enrollment is at Qq'. 
Comparative statics can be used to analyze the effect of a change or differences in one of the 
explanatory variables on the optimal subsidy level. The effect of a change is an indirect one. The 
explanatory variables influence the location of the demand, supply and external benefits schedules 
resultmg in the optimal subsidy level and the other variables in the model adjusting to a changed 
equilibrium. 
Comparative Static Analysis 
Percent of the Population College-aged 
Consider the effects of a change in the percent of the population college-aged on the public 
higher education market. An increase in this percentage is shown here affecting only the private 
demand curve for public education. A state with a large proportion of college-aged citizens will have 
a greater private demand for public higher education, ceteris paribus. This effect is illustrated by an 
upward or rightward shift in the private demand curve for public education from to D^i, m 
Figure 4. As discussed earlier, when there is a change in DQ or in the present value of external 
benefits curve, PVEB, the total demand for public higher education, D^, also changes. In this 
instance, the upward shift in to results in an upward shift in Ds to D^,. The new equilibrium 
point at El is characterized by a decrease in the per-student subsidy to S^, an increase in tuition 
levels to Pe„ and an increase in total enrollment to Qg^. The increase in tuition is not readily 
apparent but can be seen by comparing the vertical distance between and PVEB at Qei to the 
vertical distance between the original Ds curve and PVEB at QQ*. 
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Enrollment 
Figure 4; The Effects of a Change in the Percent of the Population 
CoUege-aged on the Public Higher Education Equilibrium 
The effects of a change in the percentage of college-aged population shown above graphically 
can also be demonstrated mathematically. Using equations (1), (2), (3) and (4), the effect of a 
change in one of the independent variables on the optimal subsidy level can be seen. In general, 
as* dA  ^ ds' dB  ^ as* ac 
dA dX, * dB dX, * dC dX,' 
Using equation (4), 
aS' b*c . ar ^ a . ^  ^ a 
dA a+b-i-c 'dB a+b+c ' dC a-*-b*c 
(7) ar 
dX^ 
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Substituting these into (7) gives 
(71) b-t-c dA _ a dB ^ a dC 
dXf a+b+c a-*-b+c 3Jf, a+b+c dX, 
Let the percentage of college-aged citizens be denoted as X,. Then, replacing X, with X^ in equation 
(7.1) and substituting in the partials of the intercept terms with respect to X, gives 
(8) ^ ^ Y, < 0. 
dXj^ a*b*c ' 
Since a, b, c and 7, > 0, this partial derivative is clearly negative indicating that an increase in the 
percentage of college-aged citizens lowers the optimal per-student subsidy. 
In a similar fashion, the effect of an increase in the percentage of college-aged population on 
tuition can be demonstrated. Using equations (1), (2), (3), and (S), 
(9) 
Using equation (5), 
^P'b _ dA ^ dB ^ dC 
dX, ~ dA dX,* dB ax, * dC SX/ 
dP£ If dPg a*c E 
dA a+b*c dB a-^b+c dC a+b+c 
Substituting these into (9) gives 
(9.1) ^ b dA ^ a*c dB ^ b dC 
dXi a-^b+c dXj a+b+c dX, a*b*c dX^ 
Replacing X, with Xi in (9.1) and inserting the appropriate partials gives the effect of a change in 
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the percentage of the population college-aged on tuition levels. 
(10) f^ = _5^£_Y.>0 
ax, a*b*c ' 
Consistent with Figure 4, an increase in the percentage of the college-aged population would result 
in an increase in tuition levels. 
The change in enrollment can be shown using equations (1), (2), (3), and (6), 
(11) ^ ^ _aA ^ SB ^ JC 
ax, OA dXf ^ dB dXf* dC 5X/ 
Using equation (6), 
dQ'e 1 dQ'e i dQ^ i 
dA a*b+c ' dB a+b+c ' dC a+b+c 
Substituting these into (11) gives 
(11.1) ^ 1 dA ^ 1 dB _ 1 dC 
dXf a+b+c dX, a+b+c a+b+c 9X, 
Replacing Xj with Xj in (11.1) and substituting in the relevant partials shows the effect of a change 
in the percentage of the college-aged population on enrollment levels. 
(12) ^ = _1_ Y, > 0 
dX^ a+b+c 
As with tuition, the sign of this partial is positive and therefore an increase in the percentage of the 
college-aged population would result in an increase in enrollment. 
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Average Educational Attainment 
Average educational attainment influences more than one curve. As families' average education 
level rises, they demand more education for their offspring. Borus and Carpenter found in their 
1984 study of college attendance by high school seniors that seniors whose fathers have at least one 
year of college have probabilities of 19-26 percentage points higher of attending college than seniors 
who did not (Borus and Carpenter, 1984). Parsons work on education decisions by males discusses 
the "intergenerational effect" of education, that is, youth are more likely to complete a given level of 
education if their parents are more highly educated (Parsons, 1974). 
An increase in average educational attainment would have the effect of shifting the private 
demand curve, Dg, upward to and therefore would shift the total demand curve for public higher 
education, D^, upward to Dsi as shown in Figure 5. If this were the only change, the new 
equilibrium, Ei, would have a higher enrollment of Qei, a lower subsidy of S^, and higher tuition of 
PBI. Again, the increase in tuition can be seen by comparing the vertical distance between Dsi and 
PVEB at QE, to the vertical distance between Dj and PVEB at QE*. 
$ 
A pveb, 
-5— pveb 
c 
e el Enrollment 
Figure 5: The Effects of an Increase in Average Educational Attainment on Public 
Higher Education Equilibrium 
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At the same tune that Dg shifts, the external benefits curve, PVEB, would also shift upward. 
As educational attainment rises, the individual's willingness to pay for educated neighbors also rises. 
This willingness to pay could be reflected in an upward shift of the IVEB curve, the individual 
valuation of the external benefits of education. Summing the IVEB curves vertically over the 
population gives the new external benefits curve PVEBi which is located everywhere above the 
original curve. If the shift of PVEB occurred without the change of private demand, the new 
equilibrium point could again be illustrated by E,. This equilibrium point would be distinguished by 
enrollment rising to QEI, tuition falling to P^j. and the optimal subsidy increasing to S2. The subsidy 
change can be seen by comparing the vertical distance between Ds and at Qb' to the vertical 
distance between Dsi and at QEI-
The combined effect of both and PVEB responding to an increase in educational attainment 
would be to increase the Dg schedule even more than shown in Figure 5. Thus, enrollment would 
rise but the total effect on the subsidy and tuition levels is indeterminant. This result can be 
confirmed mathematically. Let educational attainment be represented by X]. Using equation (7.1), 
substituting Xj for Xj, and inserting the appropriate partials for the intercept terms with respect to 
average educational attainment, the effect of a change in educational attainment on subsidy level can 
be expressed as follows: 
Because all of these parameters are positive, the sign of this expression is indeterminate. Thus, the 
effect of an increase in educational attainment on the optimal per-student subsidy is ambiguous. 
Substituting X2 for Xj in equation (9.1) shows the change m tuition from a change in average 
educational attainment. 
(13) dS' b*c = a, 
dX^ a+b+c a*b-^c 
(14) b a+c > « • a, + —y, — 0 
8X2 a+b+c a+b+c < 
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Therefore, an increase in educational attainment has an ambiguous effect on tuition. 
The same procedure can be used to depict the change in enrollment. Replacing with Xj in 
equation (11.1) and inserting the partials of the intercepts with respect to educational attainment 
gives 
(15) = "2 ^ Y2 ^ 0 
dXj a-*-b+c 
As demonstrated by (15), enrollment rises when average educational attainment rises. 
Per-Capita Income 
Consider the implications of a change in per-capita income on the public higher education 
market. As income rises, the private demand for public higher education will also rise since 
education is a normal good and parents are better able to fmancc the cost of their children's 
education. Radner and Miller found in their analysis of 1966 high school seniors that parental 
income positively affected the decision of whether to attend college (Radner and Miller, 1970). 
Others, including Campbell and Seigel (1967), and Corrazini, Dugan and Grabowski (1972) have also 
found income to be statistically significant in the demand for higher education. This means that 
will shift rightward, illustrating that at every tuition price, people are willing and able to purchase 
more education. Considered alone, the shift in Dg would raise Ds and thereby result in an increase 
in enrollment, a decrease in the amount of subsidy needed, and an increase in tuition levels. 
The shift in the private demand curve for public education, however, is not the only curve 
affected by per-capita income. The present value of external benefits curve, PVEB, may also be 
affected with a rise in per-capita income. As income rises for a state's citizens, the amount that the 
median citizen is willing and able to pay to enjoy the benefits of his neighbors' education will also 
rise. As in the previous example of average educational attainment, this could be reflected by an 
upward shift in IVEB, the individual's valuation of the external benefits from education. The 
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location of the new PVEB curve can be found by summing the IVEB curves vertically across the 
population. The upward shift in PVEB would cause the location of Ds to shift upward also. The 
new equilibrium point, if this were the only change, would be one in which enrollment and the 
optimal subsidy rise and tuition falls. 
In addition to the shifts in Dg and PVEB, a change in per-capita income would have the effect 
of shifting upward the supply curve for higher education, Sg. Cohn found in his 1973 study that 
institutions of higher education that are in high per-capita income states tend to pay higher faculty 
salaries. The upward shift in SQ considered alone would result in an equilibrium characterized by 
lower enrollment, higher tuition and higher subsidy levels. 
Let per-capita income be expressed as X3. Then, replacing Xj with X3 in equation (7.1) and 
substituting in the appropriate partials for the intercept terms with respect to per-capita income gives 
(16) _ = ——a, - —r—Yj + . 63 "T 
5AJ a+b+c a+b+c a+b*c < 
With all the parameters in (16) greater than zero, the effect of a change in per-capita income on 
subsidy level is indeterminate and depends on the magnitude of the shifts in the three curves. 
Tuition changes from an increase in per-capita income are also dependent upon the magnitude 
of the shifts in the three curves and can be shown to be ambiguous. 
(Vl\ ^ b a > n a, + Y- + 0, — 0 
3X3 a+6+c a+b+c a+b+c < 
The change in enrollment can be seen to be indeterminant using equation (11.1). Replacing Xj 
with X3 and inserting the suitable partials with respect to the intercepts gives 
(18) ^Q£ _ "•J * ~ Q3 ^ Q 
5X3 a+b+c < 
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Population 
Historically, population has been included in state appropriations analyses. Population must be 
included when considering total state appropriations to public higher education and per-student 
appropriations to account for differences due solely to population size. Ceteris paribus, an increase 
in the population of a state would shift the demand curve for public higher education upward to Dgi 
from Dg, reflecting the increased number of consumers. Hence, the total demand curve for public 
higher education would also shift upward from Ds to D^j. The new equilibrium, Ei, previously 
illustrated in Figure 5, would be characterized by a higher enrollment of Qe„ a lower subsidy of S„ 
and a higher tuition level of Pe,. 
Population affects the external benefits curve, PVEB, for public higher education as well. 
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the population of a state would result in an upward shift of the PVEB 
curve since the PVEB curve is the vertical summation, over the state's population, of the individual 
valuations of the external benefits of education, IVEB. As demonstrated in Figure S, an upward 
shift in PVEB to PVEB, would cause the total demand curve for public higher education to shift 
upward to Dsi from Dg. The effect of this would be a new equilibrium, E„ with a higher enrollment 
level of QEI, a lower tuition of PQJ, and an increased subsidy level of Sj. 
The combined effect of an increase in a state's population would be to increase enrollments and 
would be indeterminate with respect to tuition and subsidy. Let population of a state be X4. Then, 
replacing X, with X4 in equation 7.1 and substituting in the appropriate partials for the intercept 
terms with respect to population gives 
/iQ\ dS' b*c a > -(19) =s o. — 0 • 
dX^ a+b+c a+b+c < 
Since 04 and 74 are positive, a change in the population of a state on subsidy level is indeterminate. 
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The effect of a change in a state's population on tuition can be seen to be ambiguous with 
equation (20). 
(20) ^ L_a , _£1£_Y 0 
^X.^ a+b+c a+b+c < 
The predicted increase in enrollment is demonstrated by equation (21). 
(21) jg£ 0 
dX^ a+b+c 
Urbanization 
The degree of urbanization has been included in public higher education expenditure studies 
since Fabricant's 1952 analysis. Urbanization is expected to influence the optimal subsidy for public 
higher education because as a state becomes increasingly congested and industrialized, the individual 
valuation of the external benefits of higher education, IVEB, is expected to rise. This is because 
citizens value having educated neighbors and the corresponding increase in economic development as 
well as lower crime rates, decreased welfare costs, increased community service, etc. associated with 
higher education. The upward shift in IVEB from higher education would result in an upward shift 
of the PVEB curve. As illustrated in Figure 6, the movement from PVEB to PVEBi causes an 
upward shift in the total demand curve for public higher education from to Dg, and would result 
in an equilibrium at E,. The new equilibrium point would be characterized by higher enrolhnent, 
lower tuition and higher subsidy levels, Qg,, P^i, and S, respectively. 
Increased urbanization may also affect the supply curve for public higher education, SE, because 
higher wage rates are associated with greater urbanization. This would imply that Se shifts upward 
to Sqi and the effect of this change would be to lower enrollment to Qe2> raise tuition to Pq2, and 
raise the subsidy to Sj. The actual effect of increased urbanization on subsidies to higher education 
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Figure 6: The Effects of an Increase in Urbanization on Public Higher Education Equilibrium 
is the combination of the above two and can be expressed mathematically. Let the degree of 
urbanization be Xj. Then, replacing Xi with Xj in equation (7.1) and substituting in the appropriate 
partials for the intercept terms mth respect to urbanization gives 
(22) as* b*c a a ^ n — = ; Oj + 6, > 0. 
aXj a+b+c a+b+c 
A change in the degree of urbanization of a state on subsidy level is positive since aj and 9s are 
positive. 
The effect of a change in the degree of urbanization on tuition can be seen to be ambiguous 
using equation (9.1). 
(23) 3PE 
—— —. — T  V -
dXj a+b+c a+b*c < 
b b a * n 
a, + ——— 0< — 0 
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Enrollment is ambiguously affected by the degree of urbanization in a state as demonstrated in 
equation (24). 
(24) = "5 - ^5 > Q 
dXj a*b+c < 
Population Density 
Population density may influence the private demand curve for public higher education. As 
population density rises, the private demand curve for public higher education would rise since 
transportation costs to students would fall. If the change in population density only affected the 
private demiuid curve for public higher education, a new equilibrium (previously illustrated in Figure 
S) would occur at where the new total demand curve D^, intersects the supply curve for public 
higher education. The new equilibrium would have higher enrollment and tuition and ^EI and a 
lower subsidy level S|. 
Population density may also affect PVEB, the present value of the external benefits curve. As a 
state's population becomes increasingly dense, the benefits of higher education become more highly 
valued by the states' citizens. This implies that the individual valuation of the external benefits of 
higher education would rise, causing an upw£u-d shift in the IVEB curve and therefore a 
corresponding increase in the PVEB curve to PVEBj. If this were the only change, the upward shift 
in the PVEB curve would result in an increase in the total demand curve for higher education from 
Ds to Dsi and a new equilibrium point at E,. The new equilibrium, previously illustrated in Figure 
5, would have a higher enrollment of Qg,, a lower tuition of and a higher subsidy level of S2. 
The combined effects of the changes in PVEB and from a change in population density are 
ambiguous with respect to subsidy and tuition and positive with regard to enrollment. 
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Let population density be denoted as X«. Then, replacing Xj with X« in equation (7.1) and 
substituting in the appropriate partials for the intercept terms with respect to population density 
gives 
/"icv dS' b+c a > r, (25) = a* Y« — 0 . 
dXf a+b*c a+b+c < 
Because all of the parameters are positive, a change in the density of a state's population on the 
optimal subsidy level is ambiguous. 
The effect of a change in the density of a state's population on tuition levels can be seen to be 
ambiguous with equation (26). 
(26) ^ —^ Y. - 0 
dXg a+b+c a+b+c < 
Population density has a positive effect on enrollment levels as seen in equation (27). 
(27) ^ * ^6 > 0 
dX^ a+b+c 
Increased Future Earnings 
Numerous studies have found that expected increases in after-tax future earnings is a significant 
reason for individuals to enter college. Mattila found in his study of the determinants of male 
enrollments that the supply of males to higher education had an elasticity response to salaries that 
ranged from .86 to 1.39 (Mattila, 1982). Other authors have also found positive elasticities of 
varying magnitudes (Freeman, 1986). 
The theory of human capital, developed by Becker, asserts that individuals invest in education 
which raises their productivity and leads to greater earnings. Individuals view education as an 
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investment and choose the level of education that )nelds the highest expected rate of return. The 
expected rate of return to education is "that percentage rate of return that discounts the stream of 
earnings expected by the student over his or her life cycle back to its present value and equates them 
to the total educational costs compounded forward to the date of graduation" (McMahon, 1987). As 
expected earnings rise, students choose to invest more in human capital than they might have due to 
the corresponding increase in the expected rate of return to college education. The appropriate 
measure for individuals is the post-tax earnings differential (Verry, 1987; Galper and Dunn, 1%9). 
An expected increased earnings differential would lead to an upward shift in and as previously 
depicted in Figure 5, would result in an increase in enrollment, a decrease in subsidy and an increase 
in tuition. 
At the same time, PVEB would also shift rightward given the marginal tax rate. States expect 
to realize higher tax collections at current rates with an expected increase in future incomes. In this 
case, the appropriate measure is the pre-tax earnings differential. Windham (1976) questions the 
legitimacy of this argument for supporting subsidization for higher education, however, conventional 
wdsdom accepts this as a reasonable claim. As shown in Figure S, this shift would increase 
enrollment, decrease tuition and increase subsidy levels. 
The overall effect of an increase in expected after-tax future earnings is equivalent to an 
increase in average educational attainment which is to increase enrollment and indeterminate with 
respect to tuition and subsidy. This can be verified by equations (28) through (30). Recall that all 
of the parameters are greater than zero. 
(28) dS' _ b+c ^ a ^ Q 
dX^ a+b-t-e ' a^b-^c^^ < 
(29) 
ax, 0+6+C ' 
b 
"7 + 
a+b+c 
(30) ^Q'e ^ «7 ^ Y? ^ Q 
dX^ a+b-¥c 
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Foregone Earnings 
The dedsion to attend college is influenced hea\dly by the opportunities that a student faces 
upon completion of high school. Foregone earnings is one way to measure the opportunity cost of 
investing in a higher degree and is an important component of the expected rate of return 
calculation for higher education. Foregone earnings affect both the Dg and PVEB curves but in the 
opposite direction as future earnings. As foregone earnings rise, the rate of return to a college 
education falls, resulting in some students being drawn into the labor market after high school. 
Manski and Wise found that local wage rates, a proxy for foregone earnings, negatively influenced 
the decision to apply for college admission (Manski and Wise, 1983). This could be shown by a 
leftward or downward shift in Dg as shown in Figure 7. Figure 7 illustrates that as private demand 
for higher education falls, the total demand curve for higher education, D^, also shifts left. The 
effect on the higher education equilibrium is falling enrollment and tuition to Qei and 
respectively and rising subsidy levels to Si. 
A-i-B 
PVEB 
PVEB, 
Enrollment 
Figure 7: The Effects of an Increase in Foregone Earnings on Public Higher Education Equilibrium 
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Given current tax rates, an increase in foregone earnings will lead to less additional tax 
collections resulting from the education decision (Verry, 1987; Cohn, 1979). The loss in tax revenue 
would cause the PVEB curve to shift leftward and would lower enrollment to Qei, raise tuition to 
Pej» and lower the subsidy to as demonstrated in Figure 7. 
The combined effect of an increase in foregone earnings would be uncertain with respect to 
subsidy and tuition levels and would lead to lower enrollments. Let foregone earnings be Xg. Then, 
substituting the partials of the intercept terms with respect to Xg into equation (7.1) gives the effect 
of a change in foregone earnings on subsidy levels. Note that the intercepts are negatively 
influenced by an increase in foregone earnings; therefore these partials are negative. 
/oiN dS' b*c a > (Jlj o, Y» — 0 
dXg a+b*c a+b+c < 
An increase in foregone earnings has an indeterminate effect on subsidy levels. 
Equation (32), derived from equation (9.1) demonstrates the ambiguity of an increase in 
foregone earnings on tuition levels. 
f32) b * rt \P-^) — o, + Y, — 0 
a+b+c a+b-t-c < 
The decrease in enrollment is readily apparent from Figure 7 and can be proven by applying 
equation (11.1). Replacing the partials of the intercept terms with respect to Xj with the partials of 
the intercepts with respect to Xg gives 
(33) ^ < 0 . 
3Xg a+6+c 
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The use of foregone earnings as a measure of the opportunity cost of mvesting in higher 
education has come under fure in recent years. Many students maintain part-time jobs during their 
college career and for the most part, these are equivalent to the type of jobs held by high school 
graduates (Cohn, 1979; Campbell and Seigel, 1%7). Parsons found that foregone earnings as a 
measure of opportunity costs seriously imderestimates the true student cost of education. His study 
showed that students reduce leisure time as well as work hours for school, therefore, foregone 
earnings are only a part of the opportunity cost of education. This is significant at the higher 
education level but is much more influential at the secondary level (Parsons, 1974). 
Marginal Tax Rate 
Consider the case of an increase in the marginal tax rate. When the marginal tax rate rises, the 
private demand curve for higher education would shift downward since the present value of the 
after-tax component of the expected increase in future earnings will decline. The decrease in after­
tax expected earnings would lower the expected private rate of return to a college education. The 
downward shift in Dg seen in Figure 8 would lower Dg to Dsi and would lead to a decrease in 
$ 
aVb 
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Figure 8: The Effects of an Increase in the Marginal Tax Rate 
on Public Higher Education Equilibrium 
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enrollment, a decrease in tuition levels and an increase in the amount of per-student subsidy, Qei, 
PEI, and Sj, respectively. 
At the same time, the PVEB curve would shift up to PVEBi due to the increase in expected 
future tax collections and therefore, Ds would shift up to This shift would, ceteris paribus, lead 
to an increase in enrollment, Qe2, a decrease in tuition, Pqj, and an increase in the per-student 
subsidy, S,. Since the gain to tax revenue is equal to the loss to the taxpayer, the rise in PVEB and 
the fall in DQ should be equal and the net effect on Ds should be nil. Thus, enrollments should be 
unchanged, but subsidies should rise while tuition falls. Let the marginal tax rate be denoted by X,. 
Then, using (7.1), 
3S* b'^c (X ^ A (34) = —Oa Yo > 0 • 
a+b*c a+b+c 
Since a, > 0 and 7, < 0, this partial derivative has a positive sign. Therefore, an increase in the 
marginal tax rate would lead to an increase in the optimal per-student subsidy. 
Equation (35) confirms that a decline in tuition would occur from an increase in the marginal 
tax rate. 
(35) < 0 
a+b+c a-^b+c 
The effect on enrollment that would occur from a change in the marginal tax rate can be seen 
in equation (36). If a, and 7, are of equal values but with opposite signs, a, + 7, = 0 and the 
partial derivative of enrollment with regard to the marginal tax rate would be zero. 
(36) ^ ^ "9 "^9 > Q 
9X5 a+b+c < 
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Migration 
Migration of college educated people is a concern for many states, particularly in the Midwest, 
as graduates relocate to other regions or states. The loss of educated labor means that some states 
are unable to recoup their investment in higher education while others experience an unpaid-for 
gain. States that have a high percentage of their college graduates who remain in the state would 
have increased incentive to fund higher education while states that have a high out migration rate 
are net losers and would have a lower incentive to fiind higher education due to the loss of external 
benefits (McMahon, 1987). 
An increase in the percentage of college graduates who remain in the state would cause the 
PVEB curve to shift right to PVEBi as seen in Figure 9 and would result in an increase in public 
enrollment to Qgi, a decrease in tuition to PB„ and an increase in optimal subsidy to due to the 
resulting rightward shift in Dj to Dgi. Let the percentage of college graduates who remain in the 
$ 
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Figure 9: The Effects of Lower Out-Migration on Public Higher Education Equilibrium 
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state be denoted as X,o. Then the effects on tuition, subsidy, and enrollment can be confirmed 
mathematically with equations (37), (38), and (39). 
An increase in the percentage of college graduates who remain in a state would lead to a 
higher optimal per-student subsidy as seen in equation (37). Recall that an, is positive. 
(37) = -^a,„ > 0 
a*b+c 
Equation (38) shows that tuition would fall when there is an increase in the percentage of 
college graduates who remain in a state. 
(38) ifi = _ < 0 
ax,o fl+fc+c 
The increase in enrollment that would occur from an increase in the percentage of college 
graduates who remain in a state is seen in equation (39). 
(39) ^ = "lo > 0 
a+b+c 
Outside Funding 
Grants, contributions, endowment income, and federal aid may affect the location of the supply 
curve of higher education. Theoretically, it seems reasonable to expect that increases in outside 
sources of income would lower the supply curve of higher education as the cost-per-student is 
partially offset. Another reason why the supply curve could decline is that grant money covers a 
fraction of faculty salaries, therefore, the money that is no longer needed for faculty compensation 
could be used to hire graduate assistants for teaching which would lower instructional costs. Outside 
sources of income are predicted to lower the supply curve for higher education to S^i as presented in 
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Figure 10: The Effects of an Increase in Outside Funding on Public Higher Education Equilibrium 
Figure 10. The rightward shift of would result in a new equilibrium point Ei with a lower subsidy 
level of Si, lower tuition level of Pei, and higher enrollment level of QEI. Let outside money be 
denoted as X„. The predicted effects of outside money on the subsidy, tuition, and enrollment levels 
can be shown mathematically. Note that is negative. 
(40) ayv 
ax, 11 a^b*c ® 
As expected, the optimal subsidy level would fall with outside funding. 
(41) BPl 
ax„ a+6+c " 
< 0 
Equation (41) demonstrates that tuition levels would fall with outside money. 
(42) dQE "n 
dXyi a+b+c 
> 0 
An increase in outside money would result in an increase in enrollments as shown by equation (42). 
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An alternative view regarding outside money is posited by Bowen. Bowen asserts in his 
"revenue theory of costs" that "an institution raises all it can and spends all it raises" (Bowen, 1987). 
The consequences of his theory is that the cost-per-student could actually rise as institutions find 
new projects on which to spend the accumulated fiinds. This behavior implies that the supply curve 
for higher education would rise with outside monies resulting in lower enrollments, higher tuition 
and higher subsidy levels. The empirical results may ^ve some insight about the effects of outside 
funding sources on the cost curve of higher education. 
Junior College Enrollment 
The existence and increasing importance of 2-year public institutions has defmite consequences 
for the higher education market. The 1991-92 fiscal year has seen many states decreasing or only 
marginally increasing total appropriations for higher education with an increasing priority for 
community colleges. Thirty-four states had an average two-year percentage gain of 3 percent for 
total state support of higher education with community colleges averaging a 13 percent two-year 
percentage gain (Jaschik, 1991). 
Community colleges are included as part of the public higher education market and are 
therefore included in the subsidy, tuition and enrollment variables for the public sector. The 
percentage of public students that attend a junior college can be included in the analysis to give an 
indication as to the state governing board's philosophy towards the junior college option to meet 
enrollment needs. The existence of two-year public schools and enrollments would result in a cost 
savings to the state since it is less expensive to educate students in that manner. This would imply a 
decline or rightward shift of the supply curve for public higher education because the average cost-
per-student falls for the state. The lowering of the supply curve causes the optimal subsidy and 
tuition to fall and overall enrolhnent to rise as seen in the preceding graph, Figure 10. 
Let the percentage of students enrolled in public junior colleges be represented by X,2. Then 
the effect of junior college enrollments on the optimal subsidy, tuition, and enrollment levels can be 
seen with equations (43), (44), and (45). 
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(43) i^ = __fL_0 <0 
a+b+c 
Since < 0, it is clear that the optimal subsidy per-student falls with an increase in junior college 
enrollment as a percentage of total public enrollment. 
(«) e„ < 0 
3XJ2 a+b+c 
Tuition levels fall with an increase in the percentage of junior college enrollment. 
(45) ?«_>0 
flXjj a+b+c 
Total public enrollments rise with an increase in the percentage of junior college enrollments in a 
state. 
Private School Orientation 
The effects of the demand for private schooling on public higher education warrant further 
examination. While the vast majority of states have private education opportunities, there is a wide 
disparity in the scope of private schools. Historically, Massachusetts has had a long tradition of 
being predominantly private while Wyoming is characterized by 100 percent public schools. The 
private and public markets for higher education and the external benefits curve can be graphically 
represented as follows. 
Figure 11 illustrates that the external benefits curve, PVEB, is dependent upon total higher 
education enrollment in a state. As total enrollment rises there is a lower valuation for each 
additional student. Thus, the optimal per-student subsidy for public students is directly affected by 
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Figure 11: The Higher Education Markets with the External BeneHts Curve 
the level of private enrollment in a state since it is likely that there is a similar valuation of the 
external benefits of private and public higher education. These three graphs can be combined into 
one graph as in Figure 12 to demonstrate the link between the private and public higher education 
markets due to the external benefits curve. 
The supply and demand curves for private higher education are denoted as Sy and Dy with 
equilibrium enrollment and tuition of Qy' and Py'. The public higher education market can be 
incorporated into this graph by using Qy' as its origin point. The vertical line beginning at Qy' 
provides the vertical axis for the public higher education market. Therefore, the demand and supply 
curves for the public higher education markets, DQ and SE, have intercept terms, (B) and (C), at this 
point. 
The external benefits curve, PVEB, has an intercept point of (A) in the private market and an 
intercept point of (A-aQy') in the public market. The two intercept terms reflect the external 
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Figure 12: Equilibrium in the Two-Sector Higher Education Market 
benefits curve's dependence on total enrollment. The intercept in the public market, (A-aQy'), is 
higher when there is low private enrollment and lower when the converse is true. This relationship 
can be expressed as a partial derivative, a(A-aQv)/SQv=-a. 
As previously established, equilibrium in the public higher education market is determined by 
the intersection of the public education supply curve, S^, and the total demand curve for public 
higher education, Dg. The total demand curve for public higher education is the vertical summation 
of the private demand curve for public higher education and the external benefits curve, PVEB. 
Therefore, Dg has an intercept of [(A-aQy )+B]. The public higher education market equilibrium is 
one with enrollment 0^*, tuition P^', and per-student subsidy S*. 
Figure 13 separates the two higher education markets and incorporates the PVEB curve into 
the public higher education market graph. The PVEB intercept in the public market is again (A-
aQv ). This graphical representation facilitates the discussion of the effects of an increase in private 
enrollments on the public higher education equilibrium. 
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Figure 13: The Private and Public Markets for Higher Education 
States that are more privately oriented mil have a higher private demand curve for private 
education. The higher private enrollments affect the public education market in several ways. 
First, the external benefits curve, PVEB, would shift left in the public market reflecting the 
lower external valuation of each additional student due to increased private enrollment. The effect 
of the lower PVEB curve in the public market would be to decrease public enrollment and subsidy 
and to increase public tuition. 
The second effect of increased private enrollments would be to shift the demand for public 
education leftward. Some of the students who would have been publicly educated are drawn away 
from the public education market toward private education. This implies that (B), the intercept of 
the private demand curve for public education, is negatively influenced by the quantity of private 
education, Qy. If the quantity of private education is variable X13 in equation (2), then this 
relationship is represented by the partial of B with respect to Qv, which is 713. The leftward shift in 
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Dg would result in a corresponding leftward shift in Ds and would lead to lower public enrollment, 
higher subsidy and lower tuition. 
The private and public education markets can be represented mathematically. 
Public education Private education 
De: PE'' = B - bQe Dy: Py" = W - wQy 
SbI Pb^ ~ C + CQE 
PVEB: S = A - aQ 
Equilibrium: P^" + S = P^® 
Sy! Py® = U + uQv 
Equilibrium: Py® = Py*^ 
Qx and Qy are public and private enrollment respectively, Q is the sum of the two enrollment levels 
and Py represents private tuition. W, U, w, and u are positive parameters. Again, A, B, and C are 
intercepts which are linearly related to the explanatory variables. As with public education, the 
intercept terms for the private education supply and demand curves, W and U, are functions of some 
exogenous variables. 
The optimal solutions are: 
(46) q: = w-u 
w+« 
(47) „ , W-U. = U + u ( ) 
w+u 
(48) 
<?; = 
A*B-C - a(^^) 
w+u 
a+b*c 
(49) 
Pk = B 
A+B-C - a(^^) 
w+u 
a-t-b+c 
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(50) 
S ' ^ A - c ( ^ ) - a  
w*u 
A*B-C - a(-5^) 
w+u 
a-^b+c 
The effects of private enrollment on public enrollment, tuition and subsidy can be derived using 
n 
equations (46) through (50). Recall that B = ^ y ^v' be denoted as X,3. Then, 
replacing B in equations (48), (49), and (50), the effect of private enrollments on the optimal 
subsidy, public tuition and public enrollments can be easily derived. Note that 
= "iu < 0 and that Qy -
dX, 13 W+U 
Regarding the optimal subsidy, 
ds' a 
ax„ ax,3 
as* a 
ax,3 
1 
(12  
M-Q—f- EY,ir,-T,A,»j;YA—^ (—] 
^ w*u} a+b-t-c a+b+c I j ^ I a+6+c v w+a ) 
(51) 
a+b+c 
as* 
dX, 
- a 
"rtj ^ 
13 a*b*c a*b*c < 
^ 0 
Therefore the effect of private enrollments on the optimal subsidy to public education is uncertain. 
The effect of private enrollments on public tuition can be derived using equation (49) and 
n 
substitutmg 7iXi for B. 
1^ 1 
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ap; 
ax,, ax„ 
a+c 
a+b*c 
ill n 
E Y / V Y I 3 * 1 3 + E Y , * ,  
1 14 , 
* (4-Q* 
a*b*c a+b*€ (—1 V w+u ; 
dp; 
dx^j ax,J 
a+c 
a*b*c 
(" " \ h 
Ey P^ i* Y,3 Q'V * E Y.*iJ - M-o + Qy 
a-fb+c 
(52) dp; 
ax, 13 
a+c 
a*b*c Yi3 
a6 i i o  
a-^b*c < 
The effect of private enroUments on public tuition is also indeterminate. 
Regarding public enrollment, 
(53) 
dQE 
ax,3 ax,3 
A-C ^ 1 
dQ'e 
ax,3 ax,3 
12 
a*b*c a+b*c 
A-C 1 
+ "" " — 
a*b+c a+b-i-c 
9Qi Y„ 
f l 2  n  
+ Y,3*i3^ 
1 14 , 
fl [W-U\ 
a+b+c V >•'+'' / 
E Y^, + Yi3(?^ + E Y^, 
a+b+c Q'v 
aXjj a+6+c a+b-^c < 0 . 
As expected, the effect of private enrollment on public enrollment is negative. 
State Appropriations to Private Institutions 
Consider now the case where private schools are subsidized by the state. Let the intercept for 
the supply curve of private higher education, U, be equal to T - G where G is state appropriations 
and tuition grants to private schools and is greater than or equal to zero. There are many states 
that provide some type of flnancial assistance to private education. 
Now suppose that the grant or endowment is positive so that costs for students decline in the 
private sector. This could be shown by a rightward shift, or drop, of the private supply curve. Then 
enrolhnent will rise in the private sector and again, assuming that the elasticity of substitution 
between the two markets is not zero, the private demand curve for public education would shift left 
as some students are drawn away from the public education market. In this case it is convenient to 
consider the relationship between private price and the private demand for public education rather 
than the private enrollment since the grant directly lowers the private tuition. Therefore, the 
intercept, 6, of the private demand curve for public education is positively influenced by the price of 
private education, Py. If the price of private education is variable X,4. then this relationship is 
represented by the partial derivative of B with respect to Py, which is 7i4. 
The increase in private enrollments from the decrease in the cost has the effect of lowering the 
PVEB curve in the public education market since, as discussed previously, the height of the PVEB 
curve in the public education market is dependent upon the level of private enrollment. 
The price of private education declines and private enrollment rises with a grant to private 
schools. It is also known that if the private demand curve for public education shifts back and to the 
left, and the PVEB curve shifts back and to the left, the total demand curve, Ds, also shifts left, 
resulting in a decline in enrollment in public institutions. However, it is not readily apparent 
whether the optimal per-student subsidy rises and whether public tuition rises when this leftward 
shift in Ds occurs. These questions can be addressed with the mathematical comparative static 
techniques used previously. 
Let the private school supply curve intercept, U, be equal to T-G, where G is the state 
appropriations to private institutions and is greater than or equal to zero. Substituting T - G for U, 
the solutions can be rewritten in the following manner: 
(54) Q- = 
w+u 
(55) Py = T-G * iW-T*G) 
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(56) 
<?; = 
A*B-C - a(— 
Li w*u ) 
a*b*c 
(57) 
Pi = B-h 
A+B-C - a ( W-T*G\ 
V w*u ) 
a*b*c 
(58) 
V w+a ) a+b+c A+B-C - a 
( W-T*G\ 
\ j. 
The effect of an increase in G on the public education variables and the optimal subsidy can 
derived in the same manner as in the preceding analysis. Let Pv' be so that d(B)/d(Pv*) = 
7i4. Substituting in the solution for Py' from equation (55) for X,4 in the expression for B gives 
(59) 
B 
B = 
13 n 
E + Yi4 E 
i=l i=15 
13 R 
+ y,4 { r-G + -ii- (W-T*G) > + E 
w+u 
i=l i=15 
Then, replacing B with (59) in equations (56), (57), and (58), the effect of a grant to private 
education on the public education variables and the optimal subsidy is easily derived. 
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The influence of state appropriations and assistance to private institutions has a negative effect 
on public enrollments. 
<?; = 
dQ'e ^ 
dG 
(60) 
13 n 
+ E + Y,4 (T-G + { W-T^G } ) + 53 YPC, 
i-1 j-15 
a+b+c 
V YI4 ( •) Yu ^ w*u 
a+b-^c a+b+c (a+b+c)(w+u) 
WYu - o 
dG (a+fi+c)(w+u) < 0 
a+b*c 
( W-T*G\ 
\ w+u } 
Regarding public tuition, the effect of private institution subsidization is ambiguous. 
(61) 
a+b*c 
13 
E - Y „ | r - G  .  - ^ ( F K - r * G )  j ^  Y.1^, 
i-1 i-15 
b(A-Q ab 
a+b+c a+b+c 
j W-T+G\ 
V w+u j 
p°£ _ a+c L J- 1 + " + afe f ^ 1 
dG a+b+c [ w+u)\ a*b*c \w+u) 
dPg - (A+c) YK W + ab > 
dG (a+b+c)(w+u) 
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The effect of state funding for private institutions on the optimal subsidy for public students is 
ambiguous. 
S '  " A  f f f ^ - r + G V  
V W+K j a+fc+c (A-C) 
13 
(62) i-1 
ds' 
dG 
85' 
dG 
a-*-b*c 
w+M a*b*c 
ay^^ H- - a(b*c) > 
T-G + 
w+u 
(W-T+G) 
r* 
' )+E  FF-r+G 
a+b+c w+u 
) 
1-15 
Yu 
0 
(—1 \w+u) (a+b+c)(w+u) 
(a+b+c)(w+u) 
The effects of the grant on the price of public education and the per-student subsidy appear to 
be ambiguous and warrant further examination. If the demand for higher education is considered as 
a whole and not separated between private and public enrollment, then it follows from the Law of 
Demand that a decline in price results in an increase in quantity demanded. This fact implies that 
dQ'y SQE 
dG dG 
because if these two were equal, a decline in price would result in the same quantity demanded, 
requirmg a vertical aggregated demand curve. The restriction on dQ^'/dG and dQy,'/dG is 
equivalent to 
(63) 
dQy 
> 
dQ's dQ'y 
_ ^ 
dG dG dG dG 
w+u 
WYu ^ 
(w+u)(ja+b+c) , 
1 + a 
w+u (w+u)(a+b+c) 
a+b+c > wy,4 + a 
1 > **nri4 o 
a+b+c 
b+e 
w 
Yi« 
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Applying this restriction to the partial of the subsidy with respect to the grant gives: 
dS' ayuw-a(b+c) >«.... b+c 
i — 0 subsntuting in y,. — 
dG (a+b+cXw+u) < w 
(64) 
(a+A+c)(w+«) 
(a+b+c)(w+u) wdG 
Therefore, the effect of an increase in the level of a grant to private schools is a decrease in the 
optimal subsidy to public students. 
Substituting the restriction into the partial derivative of public schools' price ^ves: 
dP'g ab - yuiw)(a*c) >  . . . .  i + c  
= 0 substituting m y,. = 
dG (yv+uXa+b+c) < w 
(65) 
ab - (a-t-c)^ 
w _ ab - (b+c)ia+c) _ - ac-bc-c^ _ -c ^ Q 
(w+tt) ia*b*c) (M'+«)(a+fc+c) (v»'+«)(a+fe+c) w+u 
^ 6+c 
since Yu * 
w 
BPl 
— ± < 0 .  
dG 
The effect of a grant to private schools on public schools' price to students is negative. 
The preceding pages explored the effects of changes in those exogenous variables that are 
expected to vary across states; this was done from a one-sector perspective of the higher education 
market in a state. The development of the theory in this way allowed for some interesting 
predications about the influence of the explanatory variables on the optimal per-student subsidy, 
tuition, and enrollment in the public higher education market. The next chapter describes the data 
used to test the theoretical predictions. Chapter 5 describes the empirical model used to test the 
one-sector theory and presents the results. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE DATA 
Description of the Data 
The cross-sectional data used in this analysis stems primarily from three sources, the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), the 1990 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
and the 1980 Census of the Population. 
The IPEDS data is collected by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) by annual 
surveys to all recognized and accredited postsecondary institutions in the U.S. The IPEDS surveys 
replace the Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) and are for the 1988-1989 
fiscal year. Two surveys were used for this analysis, the enrollment survey and the fmance survey. 
The institutional data included were aggregated to the state level only if enrollment and financial 
data were complete or could be determined and if they were for corresponding institutions. The 
data set excludes all proprietary institutions and institutions in U.S. territories. All public institutions 
of higher education, both two-year and four-year and above, were included as well as all two-year 
and four-year and above private institutions. 
The higher education variables from the enrollment survey include total full-time undergraduate 
and post-baccalaureate students, total part-time undergraduate and post-baccalaureate students for 
the four-year and above institutions and the total full- and part-time undergraduate students at two-
year institutions. The enrollment figures were converted to full-time equivalent (PTE) students 
according to the following standard formulation provided by the National Center for Higher 
Education Management Systems. The formula for full-time equivalency is: PTE = full-time 
students+.33 (part-time students). 
The data included in the finance survey is subject to a greater level of measurement error than 
is the eiu-oUment survey data due to the vast differences among the higher education institutions and 
the differences in interpretation of the variables included in the survey. The financial data also 
include imputed data that may not accurately reflect the non-reporting institutions's fmancial 
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characteristics and may tend to underestimate the actual variation that exists in the data. There 
were many instances in the private sector where the state appropriations variable and other fmancial 
variables were missing in the data tape. This required making phone calls to the appropriate 
governing board. In all cases, the missing values were supposed to be zeros reflecting the fact that 
the state did not appropriate funds for operating expenses of the private institutions. The IPEDS 
survey data is not ideal; however, it is the most comprehensive for the nation as a whole and, 
therefore, is the best source available for this type of cross-sectional analysis. Special programs such 
as tuition grant programs for private institutions are included in the analysis wdth the use of data 
from the National Association of State Scholarship and Grant Programs. 
The demographic variables for the states were collected from the 1990 U.S. Statistical Abstract 
and the 1980 Census of the Population when 1988 data were not available. Several measures were 
created from the Census and Statistical Abstract variables to fit the needs and purpose of this 
analysis. These included foregone earnings, the increase in expected future earnings, the mar^al 
tax rate, and the net migration index. 
The variable for foregone earnings of a college student is the weighted average of the log mean 
earnings of male and female high school graduates, ages 18-24, working 35 or more hours a week. 
This measure is a reasonable proxy for the loss in income from attending college directly after high 
school and was converted to logs to correspond to the expected increase in future earnings variable. 
The data for this measure was collected from the 1980 Census. 
The increase in expected future earnings was calculated as the difference between the log mean 
earnings of college graduates and the log mean earnings of high school graduates at ages 25-34 
years. This proxy was chosen based on Mincer's short-cut method which hypothesizes that relative 
earnings is useable as a measure of the marginal rate of return to college versus high school at 
about 10 years of work experience. Mincer's short-cut method relies on the "overtaking concept" 
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which is that at the overtaking level of experience, the present value of the lifetime earnings stream 
from investing in additional schooling can be approximated by current earnings. 
Let average high school graduate earnings evolve according to the earnings function Y, = 0 
(s,x) where s is the number of years of schooling and x is the number of years of experience. Let V, 
be the present value of this earnings profile. 
where r is the discount rate. 
Let Y, be a constant level of earnings which has the same present value as the earnings profile 
for high school graduates. Define the overtaking level of experience as x*(s) such that Y, = 4> 
(s,x'(s)). That is, x'(s) is the level of experience where the annuity value of the high school 
graduate's lifetime earnings stream, V„ is equal to Y„ a constant level of earnings. Then V, can be 
written as 
In a similar manner the earnings function for college graduates can be defmed. 
Let Y,+d = <t> (s+d,x) be the earnings function for college graduates with a present value of V.+j. 
V, - /^" • (SA) 
aUs,x'(s)) 
where a = (l-e "). This takes advantage of the fact that at the overtaking point x'(s). 
y, = y, e'"dx = «-") + C |o" 
= y,(- - ^ . 
r r r 
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Let be a constant level of earnings with the same present value as x'(s+d) is the 
overtaking level of experience for the earnings profile of college graduates such that 
- 4f>(s+d^'(s+d)). Then V,+j can be written in the following manner 
v.. - V y,. e-dx.^ -J9 r T 
where a = 1-e'". 
Then, let p be an estimate of the internal rate of return to an individual with s years of 
A • 
schooling who invests an additional d years. By defmition, p is the rate of discount that solves 
(l + p)" V, = or alternatively, 
(UoY -
Taking logs. 
d ln(l+/3) - hi {(f>i^+d;c'(s+d))} - In { <f){sy(s))) 
P - ^  f Jn - hi F, } - 1 { hi - hij, ) 
This expression provides a shortcut method for estimating the internal rate of return if the two 
overtaking levels of experience are known. Solving for p can be achieved by inserting the average 
log earnings levels of college and high school graduates at their overtaking levels into the above 
equation. Mmcer argues that this can be approximated at 10 years of experience and that the 
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overtaking level of experience will be less than or equal to the reciprocal of the internal rate of 
return. It is not necessary to divide by the increase in the number of years of school, in this case 
four, smce dividing by a constant is a linear transformation of the variable. The following diagram 
illustrates the shortcut method of estimating the internal rate of return of investing in additional 
schooling. 
$ college 
earnings 
stream 
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earnings 
stream 
Ye+d s+d 
*s *s+d 
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Figure 14. Mincer's Shortcut Method for Estimating the Internal Rate of Return to Schooling 
The marginal tax rate measure for each state is approximated by total own-source tax revenue 
for a state in 1988 divided by the 1988 Gross State Product. 
The net migration index is a created measure that approximates the percentage of college 
graduates who remain in a state net of migration. The index attempts to isolate the effects of 
migration by comparing the percentage of people in a state who are college educated to the college 
participation rate in a state. 
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The net migration index equals the percent of college educated citizens in state j divided by the 
percent of college educated citizens in the U.S. in the numerator and the college participation rate in 
state j divided by the college participation rate in the U.S. in the denominator. The absence of a 
good measure of current migration necessitates the use of this measure which reflects past 
migration. However, this is not a serious drawback since the migration index is used as a measure 
of taxpayers' perceptions of migration. 
The migration measure has a population weighted mean of 1.005 and ranges from .562 to 2.21. 
The manner in which this index is calculated suggests that 1.00 is equivalent to zero net migration. 
Thus, a state that has a migration value near 1.00 is either retaining its college graduates or 
recouping those graduates that are lost due to out-migration. 
Consider the migration values associated with Alabama and Alaska, .562 and 2.145 respectively. 
Alabama is experiencing net out-migration. The migration value of .562 implies that the state of 
Alabama loses nearly half of it's expected college graduates after migration has occurred. Alaska, 
with a 2.145 migration measure, benefits from a substantial net in-migration of college graduates 
from other states. Alaska, therefore, has double the expected number of college graduates relative 
to the college participation rate in the state. 
Deflnitions of the Variables 
The educational variables used in the analysis are defined in the same manner as the IPEDS 
survey unless some aggregation was performed as in the case of state appropriations and outside 
monies to educational institutions. 
State appropriations equals all amounts received by the higher education institutions through 
acts of a legislative body, except grants and contracts. These funds are for meeting current 
operating expenses, not for specific programs or projects. Also included are state need-based 
awards to undergraduates in public institutions. The dependent variable used in the regression 
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analysis of subsidies is calculated by dividing the sum of state appropriations and need-based aid by 
PTE enrollment in public institutions. 
Tuition equals all tuition and fees, including student activity fees, assessed against students for 
education purposes. This figure includes tuition and fee remissions and exceptions and excludes 
room, board and other services rendered by auxiliary enterprises. The average-tuition-per-student 
variable in the regressions is tuition divided by PTE enrollment. 
Enrollment is PTE enrollment figures for the various institutional types under consideration. 
Private Orientation equals the PTE private enrollment in a state divided by the total PTE 
higher education enrollment in a state. 
Private Appropriations equals all amounts received by private higher education institutions 
through acts of a legislative body, except grants and contracts. These funds are for meeting current 
operating expenses, not for specific programs or projects. Also included are state need-based 
awards to undergraduates in private institutions. These monies are divided by PTE enrollment in 
private institutions to arrive at the private appropriation per-student variable. 
Outside Monies equals the sum of federal government appropriations, federal grants and 
contracts, state grants and contracts, private gifts, grants, and contracts, and endowment income. 
This measure includes fimds for specific research projects or programs, public service, etc. The 
federal grants and contract figures include pell grant revenues on the survey form but have been 
excluded in the fmance data tape and are therefore not included in this figure. This figure is divided 
by the public PTE enrolhnent. 
Percentage of the Population College-aged equals the 18-24 years old population in a state 
divided by the total state population in 1988. 
Educational Attainment equals the median number of school years completed in a state 
according to the 1980 Census. 
Per-Capita Income equals 1988 per-capita income per state. 
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Population equals 1988 state population. 
Degree of Urbanization equals percent of a state's population living in metropolitan areas in 
1988. 
Population Density equals population per square mile in a state in 1988. 
Expected Increase in After-tax Future Earnings equals the difference between the 1980 
weighted log mean earnings of male and female college graduates, ages 25-34, working 35 or more 
hours per week and the 1980 weighted log mean earnings of male and female high school graduates, 
ages 25-34, working 35 or more hours per week in a state. 
Foregone Earnings equals the weighted average of the 1980 log mean earnings of male and 
female high school graduates, ages 18-24, working 35 or more hours per week in a state. 
Marginal Tax Rate is approximated by the average tax rate in a state. The estimated tax rate 
in a state in 1988 is equal to the 1988 Total Own Source Tax Revenue (including property, sales, 
individual income, corporate income and other tax revenue) divided by 1988 Gross State Product. 
These figures were gathered from the publication State Government Finances in 1988 and the 
December 1991 Survey of Current Business. 
Net Migration equals the percent of college graduates that remain in a state net of migration. 
This is approximated by the percent of college educated in state j divided by the percent of college 
educated in the U.S. in the numerator and the college participation rate in state j divided by the 
college participation rate in the U.S. in the denominator. 
Percent Junior College Enrollment equals the percent of FTE junior college students in a state 
enrolled at public institutions. 
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CHAPTERS. ONE-SECTOR MODEL EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Variable Definitions 
In this section, the regression equations implied by the theory in Chapter 3 are developed and 
tested using linear regression techniques. The public per-student subsidy is regressed on the 
independent variables suggested by the theory. The variables and their abbreviations are described 
in Table 1. 
Table 1. Variable Definitions. 
SUBSTD 
PERP0P18 
SCHOOL 
FERCAPIN 
POPLN 
URBAN 
FOPSQMI 
LNFUTERN 
LNFOREGO = 
AVETAXRT = 
NETMIG 
OUTSTD 
PVORIENT = 
PVAPSTD 
JUCOENRL 
= state appropriations and need-based aid for public institutions and public 
students per PTE public student (dollars). 
= percentage of college aged people, 18-24 years old, in a state in 1988. 
= median school years completed in a state m 1988. 
= 1988 per capita income in a state (dollars). 
= 1988 state population (thousands). 
= percentage of a state's citizens living in urban areas in 1988. 
= population per square mile in a state in 1988. 
= the differential between log mean earnings of college graduates, ages 25-34, 
working 35 or more hours per week and log mean earnings of high school 
graduates, ages 25-34, working 35 or more hours per week in a state, 
the average of log mean earnings of high school graduates, ages 18-24, working 
35 or more hours per week in a state. 
the 1988 average tax rate of a state. 
= index of the percentage of college graduates that remain in a state. 
= outside funding per PTE student in 1988 (dollars). 
the percentage of private school students in a state in 1988. 
= state appropriations and need-based awards per PTE student in private schools 
in 1988. 
= the percentage of public students in a state enrolled in junior colleges in 1988. 
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Regression Procedure 
The one-sector model, using the cross-sectional data described previously, was run using SAS 
(Statistical Analysis Software). Regression equations were run for the three dependent variables, 
per-student subsidy for public students, average public tuition per student, and public enrollment. 
All of the estimating equations have the same right-hand side variables so the ordinary least squares 
procedure was applied equation-by-equation wthout loss of efficiency or introduction of bias. 
The variable OUTSTD, which is comprised of competitive funding sources per student other 
than state appropriations, includes federal appropriations to institutions. Federal appropriations 
were included in this variable even though it is conceivable that these monies have a separate effect 
on the dependent variable, state appropriations to higher education. Regressions were run with 
federal appropriations as a separate explanatory variable as well as with the restriction that the 
parameter estimates for outside funding and federal appropriations were the same. In the regression 
where federal appropriations was a separate explanatory variable, the parameter estimate was not 
significantly different from zero. In the restricted model that tested the hypothesis that the 
parameter estimates for federal appropriations and outside funding sources were the same, the F-
test indicated that the hypothesis could not be rejected. Federal appropriations were considered an 
important variable due to pre\aous studies, so, they were included in the variable OUTSTD. 
Partial residual plots were run to test for linearity between the dependent and independent 
variables. The plots showed some indication of outlying variables that may unduly influence the 
parameter estimates so regressions were run excluding Alaska and Hawaii to test the impact that 
these observations have on the parameter estimates. 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were computed to search for evidence of multicollinearity. 
Values of the VIF statistic greater than 1.0 indicate that some degree of multicollinearity exists. The 
criteria or rule of thumb provided by Judge, et.al. is that a VIF statistic greater than 5.0 indicates 
severe multicollinearity (Judge, et.al., 1988). A consequence of multicollinearity is that the variances 
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of the parameters are large, so the estimate may be imprecise. In this study, evidence of 
multicoUinearity was found using the VIF statistic and therefore, caution must be exercised when 
interpreting the parameter estimates. The parameter estimates do however, provide insight about 
the influence of the explanatory variables on the dependent variables. 
Plots of the residuals versus the predicted values of the dependent variables were done to test 
for departures from linearity and non-constant variance. All of the per-student subsidy regression 
plots were within accepted guidelines. 
Regression Equation 
The one-sector model can be expressed with the following regression equation. 
3UBSTD - Po + ^^PERPOP 18 + Pj SCHOOL + P^PERCAPIN + P^ POPLN + Pj URBAN 
+ Pg POPSOMI + P, LNFUTERN + p, LNFOREGO + P, AVETAXRT + P^o NETMIG 
+ Pii OUTSTD + Pij PVORIENT + P13 PVAPSTD + P^^ JUCOENRL * E 
The regression results for the SO states are presented in Table 2. Parameter estimates, t ratios, 
adjusted and VIF statistics are stated. Regression equations and results for public tuition and 
public enrollment are found in Table lA and Table 2A in Appendix A. 
Empirical Findings vs. Theoretical Predictions for the 50 States 
The regression results listed in Table 2 provide some interesting insights into the factors that 
influence per-student state appropriations for higher education. The theory outlined in Chapter 3 
explicitly predicted the direction of the effect on the subsidy variable of changes in seven of the 
fourteen variables considered relevant. The regression results are consistent with the theory 
predictions of the effects on the subsidy variable for three of the seven variables; however, of the 
four that are mconsistent with theory predictions, two are not significant at the five and ten percent 
confidence level. 
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Table 2. Regression Results for One-Sector Model of Per-Student Subsidies in the 50 States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T Values VIF R* = .6079 
a4j. R, = .4511 
INTERCEP -32193 -1.071 0.00 
PERPOP18 434.77 1.132 1.64 
SCHOOL -345.30 -1.840** 5.68 
PERCAPIN 0.18 1.622 4.21 
POPLN 49.93 1.149 2.40 
URBAN -39.52 -2.992* 3.81 
POPSQMI 1.39 1.109 3.82 
LNFUTERN 123.45 3.459* 2.44 
LNFOREGO 72.09 3.381* 2.02 
AVETAXRT 485.84 2.723* 1.83 
NETMIG 12.10 1.818** 2.30 
OUTSTD 0.68 1.934** 2.18 
PVORIENT 60.60 0.035 2.32 
PVAPSTD -1.45 -2.195* 2.28 
JUCOENRL 14.07 0.870 2.13 
* Significant at S percent. 
'^Significant at 10 percent. 
Educational attainment, percentage of population living in urban areas, and per-student state 
appropriations for private schools were found to negatively influence per-student state appropriations 
for public schools. The expected increase m future earnings, foregone earnings, average tax rate, 
migration index, and outside funding per-student variables positively influence the per-student state 
appropriation for public higher education. 
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Urbanization was predicted in the theory to positively affect per-student state appropriations for 
public schools due to the increased valuation of the external benefits from higher education as well 
as the increased costs associated with higher education provision in urban areas. The negative sign 
of the urbanization variable is consistent with previous findings and could be due to the increased 
state budgetary pressures associated with high urban populations in a state. The public tuition and 
enrollment regressions do not provide any insight about what has occurred in the market smce the 
urbanization parameter estimates are not significant in either case. 
The one-sector model predicts that outside funding per student would negatively affect the per-
student subsidy but the sign was positive at the ten percent signiilcance level. This result supports 
Bowen's "revenue theory of costs" according to which institutions spend increased revenues on new 
projects and therefore, costs per student may actually rise with an increase in fiinds. The public 
tuition regression results support this theory as well since the parameter estimate for outside funding 
is positive and significant. Outside funding could also be an indicator of quality, therefore, the 
higher faculty costs associated with prestigious colleges and universities could be responsible for the 
positive sign of the outside funding parameter estimate. 
The effect of an increase or difference in average educational attainment on the optimal per-
student subsidy was ambiguous in the theory due to the conflictmg effects of shifts in the private 
demand curve for public higher education, D^, and the public demand curve for higher education, 
PVEB. The negative parameter estimate for median school years completed indicates that the 
rightward shift in Dg outweighs the rightward shift in PVEB. The greater influence of the shift in 
DQ could indicate a preference by educated citizens to privately fund higher education and rely less 
on state appropriations. The parameter estimate for average educational attainment is positive as 
predicted in the theory and significant for the public enrollment regression but insignificant in the 
public tuition regression. 
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The positive signs of the parameter estimates for future earnings, average tax rate and 
migration index indicate that if states expect to increase their revenue from the increased earnings of 
college graduates, increased tax rates and increased percentage of college graduates that remain in 
the state, then it is in their fiscal best interest to increase funding for higher education. This 
supports the Holcombes' idea of government having an equity interest in funding education 
(Holcombe and Holcombe, 1984). The premise of their 1984 article was that the federal 
government's investment in higher education is a rational expenditure due to the income tax system. 
The income tax system grants the federal government a portion of the lifetime earnings of 
individuals so the government can be viewed as owning a "share" of the individual's increased 
lifetime wealth. The regression results of this study support the idea of government acting as 
shareholders in individual's human capital investment at the state level. The positive parameter 
estimates for future earnings, average tax rate, and the migration index indicate that state 
governments and the citizens that they represent are influenced by the pecuniary aspects of higher 
education investment. 
The public tuition and enrollment regression estimates for the future earnings, average tax rate 
and migration variables are listed in Appendbc A. The future earnings parameter estimate in the 
public tuition regression supports the conclusion that the upward shift in the PVEB curve outweighs 
the upward shift in the private demand curve, D^. The public enrollment regression results are 
inconclusive since the parameter estimate for the future earnings variable is not significant. 
The average tax rate coefficient is negative and significant in the public tuition regression and 
insignificant in the public enrollment model. The negative coefficient in the tuition regression is as 
predicted by the theory but it is unclear whether this is due to the rightward shift in PVEB or the 
leftward shift in Db since the results for the enrollment variable are insignificant. 
The migration, or the percentage of college graduates that remain in a state, parameter 
estimates in the public tuition and enrollment regressions are signiHcant at the ten percent 
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confidence level and somewhat puzzling. The parameter estimate for the public tuition regression is 
negative as predicted by the theory but the parameter estimate in the enroUment regression is the 
opposite of the theoretical prediction and is negative. This seems to imply that a leftward shift in 
the private demand curve for public higher education, Dg, has occurred. 
The foregone earnings variable was found to positively affect the optimal per-student subsidy 
level. This indicates that the leftward shift of the private demand curve for public education was 
larger than the leftward shift in the external benefits curve. The negative parameter estimate for 
foregone earnings in the public tuition regression support this conclusion. It appears from the 
regression results then that the state's valuation of the external beneHts from higher education is less 
responsive to foregone income than the private demand curve for public education. The states may 
be less responsive since the taxes on foregone earnings is a small fraction of the earnings lost to the 
individual. 
State appropriations for private institutions and for private students negatively affect the optimal 
per-student public subsidy as predicted in the theory. This is because the subsidy level is dependent 
upon total public and private enroUment, not just public enrollment, and as discussed earlier, total 
enrollment rises. Thus, the negative parameter estimate indicates that public institutions compete 
with private institutions for funding, and in this case, lose more per student than the private 
institutions gain per student. 
The regression results for public tuition and public enrollment can be found in Appendix 1. 
The results for the public tuition model follows the theory fairly well as seen by Table lA. Two of 
the parameter coefficients do not have the predicted sign, but, only one, OUTSTD, was significantly 
different from zero. 
The public enrollment regression results are listed in Table 2A of Appendix 1. The model has 
a very large due to the population variable. Four of the signs of the parameters are different 
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from theory predictions. Only one of these four, NETMIG, is significantly different from zero at the 
five and ten percent significance levels. 
Empirical Results for the 48 Contiguous States 
Table 3 provides the regression results for the 48 contiguous states. This model was run 
because Alaska and Hawaii were often outliers in the explanatory and dependent variables. The 
regression equations and results for the public tuition and enrollment regressions are included in 
Appendix A, Tables 3A and 4A respectively. 
The model described above does not have as much explanatory power with Alaska and Hawaii 
deleted from the sample. The and adjusted statistics are lower, but, there are a greater 
number of variables that are significant at the five percent level. In this regression, population 
density and the percentage of public junior college enrollment are now signiflcant while average tax 
rate and state appropriations for private students are not. Several of the parameter estimates are 
greatly influenced by the deletion of these observations. This may be due in part to multicoUinearity 
or the fact that as outliers, Alaska and Hawaii were high-leverage, high-impact observations. 
Population density is found to positively affect the optimal per-student subsidy. This supports 
the "good neighbor" argument for funding higher education since it was posited that one of the 
effects of an increase in population density would be a rightward shift in the PVEB curve due to the 
incresised valuation of having educated neighbors. The regression results for public tuition and 
enrollment are inconclusive. 
The percentage of public students that attend junior colleges has a positive effect on the 
optimal per-student subsidy as well. The theory predicted that junior college enrollment decreases 
the cost of educating public students and therefore, the optimal per-student subsidy for public 
students would decline. The parameter estimate for jimior college enrollment in the public tuition 
regression is negative and significant as predicted in theory. The positive coefficient in the subsidy 
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Table 3. Regression Results for One-Sector Model of Per-Student Subsidies in the 48 
Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T Values VIF R* = 3350 
adj. Rj = 3378 
INTERCEP 5151.54 0.211 0.00 
PERPOP18 -248.62 -0.838 1.70 
SCHOOL -405.92 -2.940* 5.51 
PERCAPIN 0.08 0.987 4.54 
POPLN 51.35 1.632 2.42 
URBAN -34.24 -3.168* 4.89 
POPSQMI 1.86 2.064* 3.83 
LNFUTERN 76.30 2.457* 3.63 
LNFOREGO 51.90 2.438* 3.24 
AVETAXRT 138.39 0.978 2.03 
NETMIG 13.86 2.716* 2.10 
OUTSTD 0.64 2.461* 2.24 
PVORIENT 809.77 0.659 2.29 
PVAPSTD -0.60 -1.198 2.52 
JUCOENRL 22.17 1.845** 2.05 
* Significant a = .05. 
**Significant a = .10. 
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regression may be due to an increased commitment by a state to promote higher education by usmg 
junior colleges to provide easier access for non-traditional and marginal students. 
Conclusions 
The empirical results for the one-sector model provide some interesting clues about the effects 
of changes in the exogenous variables On the optimal state per-student subsidy in the public higher 
education market. The most significant finding is that the variables that heavily influence future 
state government income, such as increased future earnings, average tax rates and the net migration 
index, are significant in one or both of the regression models described above while the "good 
neighbor" justification for funding higher education is not as influential, except in the case of 
population density in the 48-state regression results. 
Variables that were expected to provide cost savings to states, such as outside funding and 
junior college enrollment, and therefore decrease the optimal state per-student subsidy, were found 
to have the opposite effect indicatmg that there must be other influences not predicted by the one-
sector version of the theory. 
The regression results for the SO states contradicted the signs of the parameters outlined in the 
theory for two variables at the five and ten percent confidence level while the results for the 48 
contiguous states were inconsistent three times with the theory. This prompted the development of 
the two-sector model outlined in the next chapter to see if a more explicit treatment of the private 
sector changes the theory predictions and if the empirical results are more consistent with a two-
sector model. 
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CHAPTER 6. TWO-SECTOR MODEL OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
Two-Sector Theory 
The theory in this section recognizes the interrelations of the private and public higher 
education markets and accommodates these relationships by including in the two demand equations 
terms for the price in the other sector. 
The higher education market in a state can be depicted with the graphs in Figure IS. As 
PVED 
Total Enrollment 
Mvat* 
Enroilnant 
PuMlA 
eniollnMat 
Figure 15. The Higher Education Market with the External Benefits Curve 
previously discussed in the private enrollment section of Chapter 3, the PVEB curve is a function of 
total enrollments, not public enrollment solely. Thus, as total higher education enrollment in a state 
rises, there is a lower valuation for each additional student. The PVEB curve has an intercept term 
of (A-aQv) in the public market diagram reflecting the fact that the valuation of the benefits 
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Figure 16: Equilibrium in the Two-Sector Higher Education Market 
from higher education is dependent upon total enrolhnent, not public enrollment alone. The three 
graphs in Figure 15 can be combined into one graph as in Figure 16. 
Figure 16 depicts the relationship between the two higher education markets due to the external 
benefits curve, PVEB. The supply and demand curves for the private higher education market are 
represented as Sv and Dv respectively. The private education market has an equilibrium enrolhnent 
of Qv' and tuition of Py'. 
The public higher education market has an origin at Qv' in this diagram. Hence, the public 
higher education demand and supply curves, and SQ have intercept terms of (B) and (C) at this 
pomt. The intercept term of the PVEB curve in the public higher education market is at (A-aQy") 
because the valuation of the external benefits of higher education is determined by total enrollment. 
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Thus, the intercept of the PVEB ciu^e in the public higher education market is higher with lower 
private enrollment and vice versa. 
Equilibrium in the public higher education is seen by the intersection of Dg and Sg, the total 
demand curve for public higher education and the supply ctuve for public higher education. Ds is 
the vertical summation of the external benefits curve PVEB and the private demand curve for public 
higher education and has an intercept of [(A-aQv')+B]. The equilibrium public enrollment, 
tuition, and per-student subsidy are QB*, PE'I and S* respectively. 
The preceding ffaph is useful in showing the relationship between the two markets due to the 
external benefits curve; however, separating the two markets for higher education is helpful when 
considering shifts in the market curves. The two markets are graphically represented m Figure 17. 
The demand, supply and external benefit curves for the two markets can be represented by the 
foUovdng equations. In this section of the theory, the demand curves for both the private and public 
sectors include the others' price terms to reflect the influence of the two markets on each other. 
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Figure 17: Equilibrium in the Private and Public Higher Education Markets 
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Private Market Public Market 
(66) Dy: Pv''=W-wQv+kPE'' (67) De: PB''=B-bQE+lPv'' 
(68) Sv: Pv®=U+uQv (69) Sb: Pe®=C+cQB 
(70) PVEB: S=A-aQv-aQB 
(71) Equilibrium: Pv''=Pv® (72) Equilibrium: PE'°+S=PE® 
Qv and QB are private and public enrollments respectively, Py and Pg are private and public tuition 
respectively, and S is the optimal per-student subsidy to public students. W, U, A, B, C, w, u, a, b, 
c, k, 1 are positive parameters. The intercept terms for both markets are linear functions of the 
exogenous variables and can be represented in the following manner. 
n n n 
i-1 i-1 i-1 
n n 
i - 1  i -1  
The optimal solutions can be found by using equations (66) through (72). The optimal 
solutions are: 
S* mm A - a * [(w+Hj-flArlB -i- [-(v>'+K)-t-&<fclC + (,lu-a)W + [(fw+aj-att]!/ f 
a k -b(w+u)A*ia+c)(w*u)B+b(w*u)C+[lu(a^-c)*ab]lV+[lw(a*c)-ab]U] V 
iw+u  w+H (a+d+c) (w+u)-ft/it(a+c)-ai>it J J 
^ (,a+b+c)(w+u)-lukia+c)-abk 
(74) 
^ - luk\ A * [(^i'^•^) - ak\B * [-(w^^k) * M] C 
^ (a+i»+c) (vf+u) - luk (a+c) - abk 
^ (Ju-a) W [(/wt-a) - aft:] U 
(a+t+c)(H'+«) - luk(a+c) - abk 
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(75) />* IB - fc(w-t-M)A (a-t-c)(w-*-u)B b(yf+u)C •* [fa(a-*-c) [fw(a-t-c)-abH/ 
' (a*b*c)(}v*u) - Wk (a+c) - abk 
Qy 
(76) 
y-c/ 
w+u 
w+u 
- lu(fl*c)*ab 1 Ty+[ lw(a+c)-ab ] t/ 
ia*b*c)(w-^u)-luk(fl+c)~abk 
p* _ 
— +  — t /  
(77) 
w+w 
uJt 
w+u 
H>-fU 
- biw+u)A*(a-*-c)(w+u)B-*'b(w*u)C •*• lluia+c)*ablW * llyvia+c)-ab'\ U 
(a-t-b-t-c)(w+u)-luk(a+c)-abk 
As in Chapter 3, comparative static analysis can be used to determine the influence of the 
explanatory variables on the five dependent variables: subsidy, public tuition, public enrollment, 
private tuition, and private enrollment. The exogenous variables remain the same except that private 
orientation is not included as an independent variable because private enrollments are now 
determined within the model. 
The partial derivatives with respect to the intercept terms for the dependent variables follow. 
Equations 78-82 list the partial derivatives with respect to the intercept terms for the subsidy 
variable. 
(78) dS' 
M 
= 1 - a (w*u)-luk + akb 
(a+b+c)(w+u) - luk(a+c) - abk ^0 < 
(79) dS' a (yv*u)-akc *0 
dB ia*b*c)(}v+u)-luh(,a*c) - abk < 
(80) dS' _ a (w+u) - aluk - akb ^ 
dC (a+b+c)(w*u) - lukla+c) - abk < 
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dS' - a jlu-a) 
dW (a*b+cXw*u)-luk(a+c)-abk w+u (81) 
ak I lu(a+c)+ab 
w+u \(a+b+c){w+u)-btk(ja+c)-abk 
(82) = - a [(lw*a) - alk] ^ _a j htja+c) - ab 1  ^^  
dU (a+b*cX>*'*u)-luk(a+c)-abk w+u w+u \(a+b+cyiw+u)-luk(a+c)-abkj < 
Equations 83-87 are the partial derivatives with respect to the intercept terms for the public tuition 
variable. 
(83) _ - b(w+u) > 
(84) (a+c)(w+u) > 
(86) 
(fl+b+c)(w+u)-luk(a+c) • - abk 
ia+b+c)(}v+tt)-luk(fl+c) • - abk 
biw+u) 
(a+b+c)(w+u) - luk(a+c) - abk 
lu(a+c) + ab 
(a+b+c)iw+u) - luk(a+c) - abk 
tw{a+c) - ab 
- 0 
- 0 
(85) ^ {  ^ Q 
dPp UAtn*r\ •¥ nh > ^ 
(87)  ^ ( ^ ^ 
dU ia+b+c)(w+u) - luk(a+c) - abk < 
The partial derivatives for the public enrollment variable with respect to the intercept terms are 
listed in equations 88-92. 
(88) (w+u) - luk > Q 
cW (a+b+c)(w+u) - luk(a+c) - abk < 
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(89) dQ'e (w+u) - ai 
dB (a+b+c)(w+u) - Iuk(o*c) - abk < 
(90) _ - (w+u) + luk > 
dC (a+b-t-cXw+u) - luk(a+c) - abk < 
(91) lu-a ^ 
dW (a+b-t-c)(w+u) - luk(a*c) - abk < 
(92) dQl _ 
dU (a*b+c)(w*u) - luk(.a*c) - abk < 
(fw * a) ~ alk 
^ 0 
Equations 93-97 are the partial derivatives of private tuition with respect to the intercept terms. 
(93) dPl - ukb 
dA (<i+fc+c)(H'+K) - luk(a+c) - abk < 
(94) dPl uk (a-t-c) 
dB (a+b+cXw+u) - luk(a+c) - abk < ^ 0 
(95) d P y  ukb 
^0 
dC ia-*'b+c)iw*u) - luk(a*c) - abk < 
(96) dPZ u uk + 
dW w+tt w+« 
luja-^c) + ab 
ia*b*c)iw*u) - luk(a+c) - abk 
(97) dPv w uk 
+ 
dU w+u w+u 
lw(a+c) - ab 
(fl-*-b*c)(w*u)-lul^a+c) - abk J < ^0 
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The partial derivatives of the private enrollment variable with respect to the intercept terms are 
provided in equations 98-102. 
(98) ^ - kb > Q 
dA (a*b+c)(w+u) - luk(ja*c) - abk < 
(99)  ^ k \a*c) ^ Q 
dB (a-*-b+c)(w*u) - lukia*c) - abk < 
(100)  ^ kb > Q 
dC ia+b*c)(w+u) - luk(a*c) - abk < 
(101) _ 1 ^ k 
dW w+u w+M 
(102) ^ ^ L_ + * 
dU w+u w+u 
iu(fl+c) + ab 
(a+b+c)(,w+u) - Iuk(a+c) - abk 
Iwja+c) - ab 
ia+b+c)(w+u) - luhfja+c) - abk 
*0 
^0 
The signs of the partial derivative terms of the dependent variables with respect to the intercept 
terms cannot be determined without the restrictions that 1 and k are less than 1.0 and that w+u > a. 
The first restriction is reasonable because it is luilikely that the respective demand curves would shift 
as much as the change in the price of the other good. In other words, it is unlikely that enrollment 
in the public sector is as responsive to a change in the price of the private sector as it is to a change 
in its' own price and vice versa. The second restriction, w+u > a, requires that the sum of the 
slopes of the demand and supply curves in the private higher education market be greater than the 
slope of the PVEB curve. These assumptions allow for the signs of some of the partial derivatives 
with respect to the intercept terms to be determined since the denominator is positive. The signs of 
the intercept partials are as follows: 
3P; dPl dPl dPl dPt > 
i < 0 —£ > 0 —- > 0 — > 0 —- — 0 
dA dB dC dW aU < 
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(104) i2i.„ 
cM dB dC aw < au 
(105) ar>0 ^^0 ^>0 i^iio 
a4 < dB ac < aw < au < 
( 1 0 6 )  ^ , 0  ^ > 0  ^ > 0  ^ > 0  ^ ^ 0  
aA aB ac aw au < 
/inn aPy aPy apl apt apl > 
—1 < 0 — > 0 —- > 0 —- > 0 —- — 
aA aB ac aw au < 
TVo-Sector Comparative Statics 
Percent of tlie Population College-aged 
The percentage of the population college-aged in a state would initially affect the private 
demand curves for both public and private education. An increase in the percentage of the 
population college-aged results in a rightward shift of the private demand curve for private education 
as shown in Figure 18. Private enrollments and private tuition would both tend to rise toward Qvi 
and Pv, respectively. 
The private demand curve for public education would also rise from an increase in the 
percentage of the population college-aged. A rightward shift in would result in a rightward shift 
of the total demand curve for public higher education, Dg, and therefore public tuition, and public 
enrollments would tend to rise and the subsidy would tend to fall toward P I^, QEI, and S,. 
There are several complicating effects before a new equilibrium is attained. The external 
benefits curve, PVEB, graphed here relative to public enrollment, is also dependent upon private 
enrollment levels and would shift leftward in Figure 18 due to the increase in private enrollment. 
The total demand curve for public education would therefore shift leftward and tend towards an 
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Figure 18. The Initial Effects of an Increase in the Percentage of the Population 
College-aged on Higher Education Equilibrium 
equilibrium with lower public enrollment, higher public tuition, and lower subsidy per public student. 
The private higher education market would subsequently be affected due to the decrease in the 
public tuition. The private demand curve for private higher education would shift leftward due to 
the decrease in public tuition. These types of secondary effects will continue until an equilibrium is 
established. Graphing the complete adjustment process is hopelessly complex. Mathematics 
provides a better route to the new equilibrium. 
The final effects of the shifts in both private demand curves for public and private higher 
education can be demonstrated by the following comparative static equations. Let the percentage of 
the population college-aged be represented by X,. Then, using equations (67), (69), (70), (73), and 
(78) through (82) the effect of a change in the percentage of the population college-aged on the 
optimal per-student subsidy for public students can be seen. 
dS' _ Y|[-<'(h'-^u) - akc] ^ ^ 
ax, (a+b*c)(w+u) - luk(a+c) - abk ' 
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-ajlu-d) 
(a*b*c)(,w+u)-luk(fl+c) - abk 
(108)  ^ 8 -a 
w+u 
ak f lu(a+c) + ab 11 ^ Q 
w+u \(a+b+c)(w*u)-iuk(,a+c)-abkj\ < 
AC* > AC* > 
because 0 0 and y. > 0, a, > 0 
dB < dW < " ' 
As demonstrated by equation (108), an increase in the percentage of the population coUege-aged has 
an ambiguous effect on the optimal per-student subsidy. 
Equations (67), (69), (70), (75), and (83) through (87) can be used to determine the effect of 
an increase in the percentage of the population college-aged on public tuition levels. 
Yi (a+c)(w+tt) + 5j [lu(a+c)+ab] 
dX. (a+b+c)(w+u)-btk(fl+c)-abk 
(109) 
dPl dPl 
because > 0 —— > 0 and v, > 0 , 5, > 0 
dB dW " ' 
Equation (109) shows the positive effect of an increase in the percentage of the population college-
aged on public tuition levels. 
The ambiguous effect of an increase in the population college-aged on public enrollments can 
be demonstrated using equations (70), (72), (73), (74), and (88) through (92). 
(110) jg;_ Y, 
ax, (fl*b*c)iw*u)-luMa-*-c) - abk < dW < 
Equations (66), (68), (71), (76), (77), and (93) through (102) can be used to express the effect 
of an increase in the percentage of the population college-aged on private enrollments and private 
tuition. 
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(HI) 
dQy _ Yi*(g^c) ^ ^ 
dXj (,a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(,a+c)-akb 
Ma^cy^ab 1] ^ 0 
w+« >v+«\(a+6+c)(w+H)-Wt(a+c)-aWjJ 
dQv ^ dQy 
because —— > 0, >0 Yi > 0 and fi, > 0 dB aw ' ' 
(112) 
BPy fiUKa+c) 
^X^ (a+b+cX'**'+ii)-bik(a+c)-abk ^ 
u  ^ uk ( lu(a+c) + ab V 
w+u w+u\(a+b+c)(}v+u)-luk(,a-^c)-abkl > 0 
dPy dPy 
because > 0 >0, Yi * 0 "tid 8, > 0 
dB dW ' ' 
These partial derivatives are clearly positive, therefore, an increase in the percentage of the 
population coUege-aged would raise the optimal private enrollment and private tuition as expected 
with a rightward shift in the private demand curve for private higher education. 
Average Educational Attainment 
Average educational attainment influences the private demand curves for public and private 
higher education as well as the external beneflts curve, PVEB. As was discussed in Chapter 3, an 
increase in average educational attainment would shift both demand curves for higher education and 
the external benefits curve rightward. 
Figure 19 illustrates the tendency towards increased private enrollment and private tuition, Qvi 
and Pvi, as well as increased public enrollments, public tuition and decreased per-student subsidy 
QEI, PEI, and S^, that would initially tend to occur from increases in the demand curves for public 
and private higher education. The public higher education market is also influenced by an initial 
rightward shift in the PVEB curve due to the increased valuation of the external benefits from 
higher education. The rightward shift of PVEB would tend to increase public enrollment towards 
Qei, decrease public tuition towards PHJ and increase the optimal per-student subsidy towards Sj. 
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The initial effects of the shifts in the three curves are mitigated by the secondary shifts that 
occur due to the price interrelationship between the two demand curves as well as the shift b the 
PVEB curve resulting from the change in the level of private enrollment. Increased private 
enrollment would cause the PVEB curve to shift leftward in the public market; therefore, public 
tuition would tend to rise and public enrollment and the per-student subsidy would tend to fall. The 
tuition changes in each market also have feedback effects on the two demand curves. The 
adjustments will continue until a new equilibrium is established. 
PVEB1 
PVEB 
EnRollmcnt 
Figure 19. The Initial Effects of an Increase in Average Educational Attainment on 
Higher Equilibrium Education 
The final effects of an increase in average educational attainment on the five higher education 
variables can be determined mathematically. Let average educational attainment be Xj. Then the 
uncertainty of the change in the tuition and enrollment variables as well as the optimal subsidy for 
public students can be seen with the following partial derivatives. 
84 
— - o [l-fl f iw*u)-btk akb 1 ] + „ f -a{w*u)-akc ] 
dX^ ^ [ \ia+b-^c)(w+u)-luk(a+c)-akb j J ^ [ (a+b*c)(}v+u)-luk(,a*c)-abk\ 
(113) + a f— -a{lu-a) a_ _ ak f lu(a+c)+ab 1 1 
* [(a+b+c)(w*u)-luk{a*c)-akb w+u w+u \(a+A+c)(w+«)-iu<:(a+c)-aW:j J 
^ - 0 since ^ < 0, — - 0 - 0 Kj > 0, Yj > 0 anrf 8, > 0. 
aXj < dB dW < dA < ? ^ ' 
(114) 
(115) 
dPg - ajb(w+u) + Yj(a+c)(M'+«) + 6Jb*(a+c) + ab] y ^ 
dXj (fl+5+c)(w+H)-iMJk(a+e) - abk < 
dPl dPl dPt 
since < 0, — > 0 —~ > 0 o, > 0 y, > 0 and 6, > 0. 
M dB dW ^ ^ ' 
dQg «2 + Y2 [w+u-ak] 6^ Qu-a) > ^ 
SXj (a+fe+c)(M'+«) - luk(a+c) - abk < 
dQl dQl dQl > 
since > 0 > 0 0 a, > 0, Yi * 0 and 6, > 0 
dA dB dW < ^ ^ ^ 
dPy - Oj ukb + Y2 uk(fl+c) 
dX~ (a->-b+c)(w+u)-luk(a+c)~abk ^ 
(116) 
u ^ uk \ lu(a+c) + ab 1 
w+u w+u\(fl+b+c)(w+u)-lukCa*c)-abkj 
dPy > dP'y dPy BPy 
0 since < 0, > 0, -— >0, a, > 0 Y^ * 0 6, > 0 
aXj < dA dB dW ^ ^ 
dQy - CLjcb + -i^a-^c) 
dX^ ia+b+c)(w+u)-luk(a+c)-abk ^ 
(117) 
1 ^ k j lu(a*c) ab 11 
w+u w+u\(a+b+c)iw+u)-luk(a+c)-akbl\ 
dQy > dQy dQy dQy 
0 since < 0 > 0 > 0 a, > 0 y, > 0 and 8, > 0 
dX^< dA dB dW ^ ^ ^ 
Per-capita Income 
Consider the effects of a change in per-capita income. Initially, an increase in per-capita 
income positively influences the private demand curves for private and public higher education as 
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well as the respective supply curves for each market. The external benefits curve, PVEB, is also 
positively influenced initially by an increase in per-capita income. The effects of the initial multiple 
shifts in the two markets as well as the subsequent secondary movements are ambiguous for all five 
of the higher education variables. Let per-capita income be X3. Then the effects of an increase in 
per-capita income on the five higher education variables can be shown in the ensuing equations. 
ax. 
1 = 0, \l-a I- I 1 
3 I \(a-t-b*c)(w+u)-Utk(a+c)-abk J J 
- a()v+u)-akc 
(a+b+c)(w*u)-luk(a+c) -abk 
(118) 
+ e. [ a(}v+u)-aluk-dkb 
+ Aj 
' [(a*b+c)Ov+u)-luk(a+c)-abk 
-a(lu-a) a_ ak j lu(a+c)*ab 1 1 
(a-t-b+c)iw*u)-luk(a*c)-abk w+« w+u \ (a+b+c)(w-^u)-luk(a+c)-abk J J 
-a [Ow*a)-alk] ^ _a / lw(a*c)-ab 1 1 
(a+b+cXw+u)-luk(a+c)-abk w+u w*u \ (a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(fl+c)-abk J J 
as > « ,. as* > « as* ^ as* > « as* > « 
— - 0 because — 0, — > 0, 0, 0 
aXj < dA < dB dC< dW< 
— 0, Oj > 0,Y3 > 0, 6j > 0,8j > 0 and Xj > 0 
dU < 
dPg -a^b(w+u)+y3(a+c)Cw+u)+Qjb(w+u)+bj[lu(,a+c)+ab]+Xj[lw(a+c)-ab} 
aXj (a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(,a+c)-abk 
(1^^) dPg > dPt dPl dPg dPt dP'g > 
—5 - 0  because — - < 0  — > 0  — i > 0 — > 0 ,  — -  -  0 ,  
9X3 < dA dB dC dW aU < 
> 0, > 0, 83 > 0, 83 > 0 and X3 > 0 
aQe OJUW+M)-^!:] + + 63 I-(M'+«)+M] + Sjliw-a] + AjK/w+a)-*!/*:] 
d X j  [(a+i+c)(w+H) - luk(a*c) - abk} 
(120) gQ' QQ' QQ- QQ' QQ' QQ* 
- 0 because — > 0 — > 0 — < 0 — - 0 ^  > 0. 
aXj < dA dB dC dW < dU 
ttj > 0, Y3 * 63 * 0. 83 > 0, and Xj >0 
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(121) 
(122) 
dPy - a^ukb + Ys ukifl*c) + 63 ukb 
(a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(a+c) - abk 
-
+ Xj 
II ^ lit f lu(a*c) + ab 1 1 
w^-ii w+ii \ (o+i+c)(M'+ii)-iuJl(a+c) - akb J J 
w ^ uk lw(,a*c)-ab 1 ] — 0 
tv+ii w+u \ (a+b+cX^+uyiuJtCa+c) - akb j J < 
3Py dPy dPy dPy dPy > 
since — - < 0  — -  >  0  — -  >  0  — ~  > 0  — -  0  
d A  d B  d C  d W  d U <  
aj > 0 Y3 > 0 63 > 0 flj > 0 Aj > 0 
dQy - ctjkb + y^k(a+c) + QJcb 
dXj (a*b+cy}^*u)-luk(a+c) - akb 
+ 8, 
+ Xj 
1 ^ k \ Uija-t-c) + ab 
w+« w+u I (a+6+c)(w+«)-fii*(a+c) - abk } ]  
_i_ _JL / lw(a+c)-ab 1 ] * q 
w*u w+u \ (a+b+cXw+u)-iuk(a+c) - akb j J < 
dQy dQy dQy dQy dQy > 
since — < 0 — > 0 — > 0 — > 0 — - 0 
d A  d B  d C  d W  3 U <  
ttj > 0 Yj > 0 0j > 0 Sj > 0 aiul Xj > 0 
Population 
A change in the population of a state has the same effect on the two higher education markets 
as a change in average educational attainment; initially an increase in population will positively affect 
the two demand curves for higher education as well as the PVEB curve. Figure 19 can be used 
again to illustrate the initial tendency towards increases in private enrollment, private tuition, and 
public enrollment and the ambiguities with respect to public tuition and the optimal per-student 
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subsidy. However, as with an increase in average educational attainment, the ultimate effects of an 
increase in population on the five higher education variables are completely ambiguous due to the 
secondary adjustments that occur. 
Let population be denoted as X4. Then, the final effects of an increase in the population of a 
state on the tuition, enrollment and subsidy variables can be demonstrated mathematically in 
equations (123) through (127). 
— - a fl-a [ {w*u)-luk * akb I 1 + v [ -aiw+u)-akc 1 
dX^ * [ \(a+b-*-c)iw+u)-lukia+c)-akb j j * [ (a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(a+c)-abk\ 
(123) + a f -a(lu-a) _ _a aJ^ ( luia-*-c)+ab 1 1 
* [(a+b+c)(w*u)-luk(a+c)-akb w+u w+u \(a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(ja-t-c)-abkl \ 
as* > „ . as* ^ as* > « as* > „ ^ A 0 since < 0, 0 — 0 > 0, y* * 0 ond 8. > 0 
3X4 < dB dW < dA < < • * 
(124) 
(125) 
dPg - a^b(w+u) •+ Y4(<'+0(w+«) + 6^llu(a+c) + ab] > 
dX^ (a+b+c)(w+u)-lult(a+c) - abk < 
dPl apl dPl 
since < 0, > 0 > 0 a. > 0 Yj * 0 and 6. > 0 
dA dB dW * ^ * 
dQs ^ C4 [(w+h)-M] -t- Y4 [w+K-a^] 6^ Qu-a) > ^ 
dX^ ia+b+c)(w+u) - luk(a+cy - abk < 
^Qe ^QE ^QE > 
since > 0 > 0 0 a. > 0, y^ > 0 and 6. > 0 
dA dB dW < * : * 
dPy - a^ukb * Y4 ukia*c) f „ uk 
— + Oj +- f lu(.a*c) + ab l 
\(a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(fl*c)-iU}kj dX. (a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(a+c)-abk * I w+m w+m fc )(>4' 
(126) 
dPy > dPy dPy dPy 0 since < 0, > 0, >0, o. > 0 > 0 > 0 
dX^ < dA dB dW * * * 
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(127) 
dQy - a^kb + y^k(,a+c) 
dX^ (a+b+c)(w+u)-bA(ja+c)-abk + d. W+« W+B 
lu(,a+c) + ab 
(ft *b+c)(w->-u) -luk(a*c) -akb 11 
dQy > 
^X^ < 
dQy dQy 
dB 
dQy 
dW 
0 since —^ < 0 —^ > 0 —^ > 0 o. > 0 v* > 0 and 6. > 0 ao an/ • <4 4 
Urbanization 
The degree of urbanization in a state affects the location of the two supply curves and the 
PVEB curve initially. Figure 20 illustrates the initial effects of the rightward shift in PVEB and the 
leftward shifts in Sv and SQ. 
The leftward shift in the supply curve for the private market, Sy, would tend to decrease private 
enrollment and increase private tuition towards Qyi and Pvi- The leftward shift m the public market 
supply curve, Sg, would initially push the equilibrium point toward E, with a decline in enrolhnent 
(A«Qy)+B 
A'-«0, 
A-aQ, 
Privat* 
Enrollmtnt PiAlle 
Enrollmant 
Figure 20: The Initial Effects of an Increase in Urbanization on Higher Education Equilibrium 
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toward QB,, an increase in tuition toward PQI and an increase in the optimal per-student subsidy 
toward Sj. 
The rightward shift in PVEB to PVEB, that occurs would tend to increase enrollment toward 
Qe2, decrease tuition toward Pe2 and increase the optimal subsidy toward S2. 
Again, there are secondary effects that occur due to the changes in tuition in both markets as 
well as the change in private enrollment. The PVEB curve would shift rightward when private 
enrollment declines and the two private demand curves would shift due to the price changes in the 
other market. Thus, the final effects of an increase in urbanization on the higher education variables 
must be determined mathematically. 
Let the degree of urbanization in a state be denoted as Xj. The effects of an increase in the 
degree of urbanization in a state on the higher education variables are presented in following 
equations. 
(128) 
dS' 
dXf 03 1 -»{ iw*u)-luk*akb (a*b+c)(w+u)-Uik(,a+c)-abk + e, 
-allw+a-alk] 
' l(a+b•^cXiv+u)-^uJk(a+c)-abk 
}] 
K-«_ - I. 
W+U W+U [I 
[ a(w+u)-aluk-akb 
* Ua+b*c)iw*u)-luk(a*c)-akb 
lw(a+c)-ab 
(a+b+cXw*u)-luk(a+c)-abkl ^0 < 
(129) dPg - ajb(_w*u) + djb(w+u) + Xj [lH>(a+c)-ab] > ^ 
5X. (a+fe+c)(K'+«)-i<Jt(a+c) - abk 
(130) "s [(H'+«)-M:1 + 0j [-(w+u) + luk] + Xj[(/w+a)-aflk] > ^ 
dX, (a+b+c)(w-^u)-lukia+c) - abk 
(131) dPt ttj ukb +BfUkb , , w I + uk i 
dXj (a*b+c)(w*u)-luk(a+c)-abk * [w+b w-*u\ia*b+c)(w+u)~luk{a-*-c)-abk 
lw(fl*c)-ab 
(132) dQy 
dXj 
- Uj kb 1- 6jkb 
(a*b-*-cXw+u)-lui(a*c)-abk * A, 
1 ... * lw(a+c)-ab 
w*u H>+B [(a*b->-cXw+u)-luk(fl*c)-abk 
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The Hnal effects of an increase in urbanization on the higher education variables are completely 
ambiguous as demonstrated by equations 128 through 132. 
Population Density 
An increase in the population density of a state would initially shift the demand curves for both 
the private and public higher education markets and the PVEB curve. Figure 19 can again be used 
to illustrate these shifts and the initial effects associated with an increase in population density. 
The upward shift in the demand curve of the private higher education market to Dvi would 
tend to increase private enrollment toward Qvi and increase private tuition toward Pvi. The upward 
shift in the public market supply curve to Dgi would tend to increase public enrollment toward 
increase public tuition toward Pei» and a decrease the optimal per-student subsidy toward S^. The 
initial upward shift in the PVEB curve would positively affect public enrollment and subsidy toward 
QEI and Sj respectively, and negatively influence public tuition toward PB2-
The secondary adjustments that occur due to changing tuition levels and changing private 
enrollment further complicate the analysis. The adjustments continue until a new equilibrium is 
established. 
The mathematics below identify the fmal effects of a change in population density after all of 
the repercussions have occurred and a new equilibrium is obtained. Let population density be X«. 
The partial derivatives are as follows. 
dS' 
- [l-a |. (a*b+c)(w*u)-luk(a+c)-akb 
iw+u)-luk + akb 
ia*b+c)(w+u)-luk(,a+c)-aUc 
-aiw+u)-akc 
(133) 
(a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(a+c)-akb w+u w+u \(a+b*c)(w+u)-luk(fl+c)-abk 
-a(lu-a) a ak f lu(a+c)*ab i II  
0 since 
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(134) 
(135) 
SP't ^ - a^Kw*u) + ytia^c)iw+u) + 6^[lu(a+c) + ab] > ^ 
dXf (a-»-fc+c)(w+H)-M(a+c) - aWk < 
dPg dPl dP's 
since < 0,—=• > 0 —=• > 0 > 0 v. > 0 aitd > 0 
M dB dW * ® 
SQE _ tte [(w^H)-^*] Ye + fig Uu-a) > ^ 
dX^ (fl+b*c)(w+u) - bik(a+c) - abk < 
dQl dQl dQl > 
since > 0 > 0 0 > 0, y- > 0 and 8* > 0 
dA dB aiF < * " 
dPy _ - tCg ukb + Ye uKa+c) ^ ^ 
aXj (a+b*c)(w+u)-bdia+c)-abk * 
(136) 
u ^ uk {&«(a+c) * ab 1 (a+i+c)(w+n)-lukKfl+c) -abkj 
dPy > dPy dP'y dPy 
0 since < 0, > 0, >0, a- > 0 y* > 0 8* > 0 
ax. < M dB dW ' '* « 
(137) 
dQy _ - ^ y^a*c) ^ ^ 
dX^ (a+b+c)iw+u)-luk(a-t-c)-abk * 
1 k 
+ 
w+u w+u l(a+i>+c)(w 
f lu(,a+c) + ab 1 1 
\( b +u)-b^a+c)-akbl J 
dQy > dQ'y dQ'y dQ'y 
0 since < 0 > 0 > 0 a- > 0 Y* 0 ond 8* > 0 
dXf < dA dB dW * * 
Increased Future Earnings 
An increase in expected future earnings from obtaining a college education initially would 
positively influence the private demand curves for public and private education as well as the 
external benefits curve. As with the case of increased average educational attainment illustrated in 
Figure 19, the signs of the partial derivatives of the education variables after all adjustments and 
interactions have occurred are ambiguous. Let the future earnings independent variable be 
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represented by X7. Then the final eH^ects of an increase in expected future earnings are expressed by 
the following equations. 
dS* _  ^ I (w+u)-luk •» aJkd 11 f ~a(w+u)-altc 
d X j  '  I \(a+b+c)Cw+u)-Iuk(a+c)-akb j J [ (a+b*c)Cw+u)-luk(a+c)-abk 
(138) +5 [ -a(lu-a) _ a _ ak ( iu(a*c)*ab ] 1 
' [(a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(a-t^c)-ald> w+u w+u \(a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(a+c)-abkj J 
as* > « as* ^ ds' > \ ds' > ^ ^^ 
_ _ 0  —  —  — - 0  « , > 0 . Y , > 0  0  
(139) 
(140) 
dPg - a^b(}v+u) + y-,(a+c)(w+u) + 6^[lu(a+c) + ab] > ^ 
9X, (fl+£>+c)(w+«)-Wk(a+c) - abk < 
dPt dPl dPr 
since < 0, > 0 > 0 o, > 0 v, > 0 and 8, > 0 
dA dB dW ' ^ 
dQg a, [(w+u)-M] + Y7 [w+H-dt] + (lu-a) > ^ 
aXj (a+i»+c)(w+«) - luk(a+c) - abk < 
dQi dQt dQ' > 
since > 0 > 0 0 a, > 0, Yt * 0 ond fi, > 0 
dA dB dW < ' ' ' 
aPy -87 ukb + Y7 «*(a+c) ^ 
dX. (a+b+c)(w+u)-lukCa+c)-abk ' 
(141) 
u uk + 
w*u w+u 
( lu(a+c)+ab 1 1 
\ia->-b+c)iw+u)-luk(a+c)-abkj \ 
dPy > dPy dP'y dPy 
0 since < 0, > 0, >0, a, > 0 y-, > 0 6, > 0 
axj < dA dB aw \ ^ ' 
(142) 
dQv * l-iKa^c) ^ ^ 
dXy (a+b*c)(w+u)-luk{a*c)-abk ' 
1 . * 
w+u w+u l(c+fc+c)(w 
i lu(a+c) + ab 1 1 
\(a b +u)-luk(fl+c)-akbl J 
dQy > ^Qy ^Qv ^Qy 
0 since < 0 > 0 > 0 a, > 0 Y7 ^ 0 and 4, > 0 
ax, < dA dB dW ' " ' 
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Foregone Earnings 
An increase in foregone earnings initially affects both of the demand curves for higher 
education as well as the PVEB curve as depicted in Figure 21. An increase in foregone earnings 
would lead to a leftward shift in the three curves due to smaller increments to personal income and 
a smaller increment loss to state income. A leftward shift in the private demand curves for public 
and private education, Dg and Dy, would tend to decrease public and private enrollment toward QBI 
and Qvi in Figure 21, decrease public and private tuition toward Fei and J'vu and increase the 
optimal per-student subsidy toward S^. 
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Figure 21; The Initial Effects of an Increase in Foregone Earnings in the Higher Education Market 
The initial leftward shift m PVEB to PVEB^ would tend to decrease the optimal per-student 
subsidy toward S2, increase public tuition toward PE2, and decrease public enrollment towiu-d Qgj. 
The ultimate effects of an increase in foregone earnings on the higher education variables are 
uncertain due to the secondary adjustments that occur after the initial shifts in the demand curves 
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and the PVEB curve. Equations (143)-(147) illustrate uncertainty. Let foregone earnings be 
represented by Xg. Then the final effects of an increase in foregone earnings on the higher 
education variables can be seen mathematically to be ambiguous. Note that ag < 0, 7g < 0, and 
< 0. 
dS' 
dx. 
= a. 1 - a ( iw+u)-luk + akb 1 | 
\ {fl+b*c)iw*u)-lukia+c) - akb J J 
Y| -aCw+u)-akc 
+ 6. 
(143) 
(fii*b+c)(,w+u)-luk(a-¥c) - abk 
- a (lu-a) 
* [(a+b+c)(w+u)-luk(fl+c)-akb w+u w+u 
ak I luCa+c)+ab V 
v* \(a+b-*-c)(w+u)-luk(a+c)-akbj 
(144) ~ agfeCw+u) + Yg(a+c)(w+a) + d,[&<(a-fc) + ab] > ^ 
dX, ia+b+c){w+u)-luHfi-*-c) - abk 
(145) dQ'^ ttg [w-i-u-M] + {bt-a) > ^ 
(a+b+c)(yv+u)-luk(a*c) - abk < 
(146) ^ = -eifUkb Y| ukCa+c) 
* »J— + 
3Xg (a+6+c)(w+u)-/ujk(a+c)-aW: "w+u w+u ^(a+fc+c)(w+u)-M(a+c)-adjfc 
uk f 
\(i 
to(a+c)+ai> 
^0 
.  < •  
(147) 
dQv ^ -ttgto yjc(a*c) 
dXg (a+b+c)(w+u)-lukCa+c) - akb 
+ fi. 
1 k 
+ { (a+ lu(a-hc)+ab w+u w+u 1 b+c)iw+u)-hkia+c) - abk 
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Marginal Tax Rate 
An increase in the marginal tax rate would initially shift downward the private demand curves 
for public and private education and would shift upward the external benefits curve as seen in Figure 
22. The downward shifts in the two demand curves to DB, and Dyj respectively, tend to lower 
enrollments, Qei and Qvi, raise tuitions, Pgi and Pvu and raise the optimal per-student subsidy, Sj. 
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Figure 22: The Initial Effects of an Increase in the Marginal Tax Rate 
on Higher Education Equilibrium 
The initial upward shift in the external benefits curve to PVEBj would tend to increase the 
subsidy to Sj, increase enrollment to QE2I ^d decrease tuition to ¥^2- 1° this case, some of the 
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partial derivatives of the higher education variables with respect to the ultimate effects of an increase 
in the marginal tax rate can be determined with the mathematics. Let the marginal tax rate be X,. 
The final effects of an increase in the marginal tax rate are given by the following equations. Note 
that a, > 0, 7, < 0, and Sg < 0. 
(148) dXf 
w*u-luk*akb 
- — ajl-ai- * -l k*akb 11 ^ 
« I v(a+i>+c)(H'+B)-M(fl+c)-aJt&jJ \{a*b*c)(w+u)-luk(,a+c)'akb\ 
^J -a(lu-a) a ak f lu(a+c)*ab 11 ^ ^  
\(,a+b+c)(}v*u)-luk(a*c)-akb w+u w+u \(a+i+c)(w+u)-i«Jt(fl+c)-oJtftjJ < 
+ yJ -a (w+u)-akc 
(149) dPg -afb(}v+u)+fg(,a+c)(,w*u) + bg[lu(a+c)+abl 
(a-t-b+c)iw+u)-lukia+c)-{U>k < 0 
(150) 3Qe ajiw+u-!uk]+y,[w+u-ak] + i^ilu-a) > ^ 
(a+b+c)iw+u)-luk(a-¥c)-abk < 
(151) Ei -a^ukb+y^k(a-t-c) 
dXa (,a+b*c)(w->-u)-lukia+c)-abk 
. \ u uk J 
'I w+u w+a I' 
lu(fl*c)+ab 
(a+b*c)(}v*u)-luk(a+c)-abk\ < 0 
(152) dQy -a^-^yjdo+c) 
dXg (a*b*c)(,w+u)-lukia+c)-akb 
1 k lu(a+c)+ab V 
(a+b+c)iw+u)-ltJB(,a+c)-akbj < 0 
Equations (151) and (152) indicate that after full adjustment there is a net lowering of the 
private demand curve for private education. This must be so because both private tuition and 
enrollment decline. The ultimate decrease in public tuition is consistent with the initial decrease in 
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the private demand for public higher education and the increase in the external beneHts curve. The 
uncertainty of the change in public enrollment and subsidy per student stems from the 
interrelatedness of the two markets for higher education. 
Migration 
A decrease in migration, or an increase in the percentage of college educated students who 
remain in a state, would initially shift the PVEB curve upward in the public higher education market 
as shown in Figure 23. The rightward shift in PVEB tends to increase the optimal per-student 
subsidy and public enrollment toward S, and QEI, and decrease public tuition toward PEI. 
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Figure 23: The Initial Effects of a Decrease in Migration on Higher Education Equilibrium 
Let the percentage of college graduates who remain in a state be Then, equations (153) 
through (157) show that even after the repercussions in the private market and the feedback effects 
into the public market there still occurs a decrease in public tuition and an increase in public 
enrollment. The ultimate decrease in private tuition and private enrollment is indicative of a 
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leftward shift in the private demand curve for private higher education that would occur from an 
increase in the support of public higher education. The change in the optimal per-student subsidy 
for public students is unknown as seen in equation (153). Recall that QU > 0. 
(153) = (w*u)-luk*akb 11 > ^ 
aXjQ [ \(a*b+c)(w+u)-!uk(a*c)~abkj\ < 
(154) 
(155) 
(156) 
(157) 
_ [ - b(w+u) 
ax, 
= a 
10 
10 
dQl 
9*10 
= ai(j-
aPy 
[ {a+b+c)iw*u)-lukia*c) - abk 
w+u-luk 
_(,a+b*c)iw*u)-luk(a-*c) abk 
f -ukb 
[ (a+f>+c)(w+u)-Zuik(a+c) - abk 
r - kb 
SXjj '*^'\ia+b+c)(w+u)-lukia+c) - abk 
< 0 
> 0 
< 0 
< 0 
Outside Funding 
An increase in outside funding for public higher education institutions is expected to lower the 
supply curve for public higher education. Figure 24 illustrates this shift. The decrease in the public 
supply curve would tend to increase public enrollment and decrease the optimal per-student subsidy 
and public tuition. 
The secondary effects of an increase in outside funding for public institutions would include a 
leftward shift in the private demand curve for private higher education due to decreased public 
tuition which would tend to decrease private tuition and enrollment. Feedback effects on the public 
market would occur because the PVEB curve would shift upward due to decreased private 
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Figure 24; The Initial Effects of an Increase in Outside Funding to Public Institutions 
on Higher Education Equilibrium 
enrollments while the private demand curve for public education would shift left due to decreased 
private tuition. These adjustments continue until a new equilibrium is established. 
Let outside funding be Xn. Then the fmal effects of an increase in outside money for public 
institutions on the equilibrium values of the five higher education variables can be demonstrated 
mathematically with the foUomng equations. Note that 
(158) dS' 
ax, 
= 0 11 
11 
a(,w+u)-aluk-akb 
(a+ii+c)(w+tt)-iiiJt(a+c)-ai)lk ^0 
(159) 
dX, 
= 0. 
11 
bjw-t-u) 
(a+b+c)(w+u)-bik(a*c)-aUc < 0 
(160) dQc 
dX„ 
= 0. -(w+u)*luk 
(a*b*c)(w*u)-luk(a-*-c)-abk 
> 0 
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(161) dPl ukb < 0 
ia*b*c)iw*u)-lukia*c)-abk 
(162) 
ia-*'b+c)iw*u)-luh(.a*c)-abk 
kb < 0 
The preceding equations are consistent with a decline in the supply curve for public higher 
education; public enrollment would rise and public tuition would fall reflecting a movement down 
the public demand curve. Private tuition and enrollment would fall reflecting a leftward shift in the 
private demand curve for private education as students are drawn into the public market. Again, the 
change in the optimal per-student subsidy for public students is ambiguous. 
State Appropriations to Private Institutions 
State support of private institutions in the form of appropriations and need-based subsidies to 
private students would lower the supply curve in the private higher education market. The rightward 
shift in the private supply curve would tend to increase private enrollment and decrease private 
tuition as seen in Figure 25. 
The increase in private enrollment would tend to lower the PVEB curve and the decrease in 
private tuition would tend to shift the private demand curve for public higher education leftward. 
These changes would then have feedback effects in the private sector and the adjustments will 
continue until , a new equilibrium is established. The final effects of an increase in state 
appropriations to private institutions on the higher education variables can be seen mathematically. 
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Figure 25: The Initial Effect of State Funding for Private Institutions on the 
Higher Education Market 
Let state funds for private higher education institutions be represented by X12. Equations 
(163) through (167) illustrate the uncertainty of the final effects of a change in state fundmg of 
private schools on the five higher education variables due to feedback effects between the two 
markets. Recall that A22 < 0. 
(163) 
dS' 
dX,, ^12 I  
ok 
-a[lw*a-alk] 
w+u 
(a*b+c)iw*u)-luk(fl+c)-aMc 
lw(a+c)-ab 
w*u 
(a+fc+c)(w+«)-luk(,a+c) —-I ] - 0 i-abk\ J < 
(164) dPl 
dX, 
= X 
12 
12 
lw(a*c)-ab 
(a-*-b+c)iw+u)-luk(a+c)-abk 
(165) dQi 
ex, 
= x 12 
12 
(fw+a)-alk 
(a+b-<-c)(w+u)-luk(a+c)-abk 
< 0 
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(166) dPl 
dX, 
= A 
12 
12 
uk lw(fl-yc)-ab 
w*u w+u l{o+t+c)(M'+K)-iHjfc(a+c) 
(167) 3Qy 
dX, 
= A. 
12 
12 £;i hv(a+c)-ab w+u w*u [(a+b+c)(w-*-u)-luk(a*c)-abk 
Junior College Enrollment 
Junior college enrollment initially affects the location of the public education supply curve. 
The effect of an increase in junior college enrollment is analogous to an increase in outside funding 
for public schools. An increase in the percentage of junior college enrolhnent in the public market 
would initially lower the public supply curve due to the cost savings associated with two-year schools 
as previously shown in Figure 24. Initially, this would increase total public enrollment and decrease 
the optimal subsidy and public tuition. The fmal effects of a change in junior college enrollment on 
the five higher education variables after all market adjustments are seen with equations (168) 
through (172) below. Let the percentage of junior college students in the public market be Xjj. An 
increase in the percent of junior college enrollment lowers S^, thus < 0. 
(168) as' 
3X, 
= 0 
13 
13 
a(w+u)-aluk-akb 
(a+6+c)(w+u)-iuJk(a+c)-abjk ^0 
(169) ap* 
ax, 
= 0 
13 
13 
b(w+u) 
(a+b+c)(w*u)-lukCa+c)-abk 
< 0 
(170) dQE 
ax, 
= 0 
13 
13 
-(w+u)+luk 
(a+b+c)(w*u)-luk(a+c)-abk 
> 0 
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(171) 
(a+b*e)(yv+u)-luk(a*c)-abk 
ukb < 0 
(172) 3Qy kb < 0 
(a+6+c)(w+a)-M(a+c)-aW: 
The decline in public tuition and the rise in public enrollment is consistent with a movement 
down the private demand curve for public higher education. The decrease in private tuition and 
enrollment indicates that a leftward shift in the private demand curve for private higher education 
has occurred due to the decline in public tuition. The change in the optimal per-student subsidy for 
public students remains ambiguous. 
The preceding pages described an attempt to account for the influence of private higher 
education institutions on the public higher education market when changes in the identified 
explanatory variables occur. In the two-sector model, several predictions emerge about the 
directions of changes in the higher education variables, but the optimal per-student subsidy for 
public students is the most elusive of all the variables and it is ambiguously related to every 
determinant due to the link between the public and private higher education markets. Statistical 
techniques will be used to determine the influence of the explanatory variables on the higher 
education market and will provide some insight into the usefulness of the two-sector analysis versus 
the one-sector analysis described in a previous chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7. TWO-SECTOR EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
Regression Procedure 
The two-sector regression model includes the explanatory variables used in the one-sector 
model except the percentage of students enrolled in private institutions in a state. Private 
enrollment is not included as an explanatory variable because it is determined within the two-sector 
model. The five higher education variables contained in the two-sector mathematical model are 
included as the dependent variables. The private tuition regression includes an observation for 
Wyoming even though private institutions do not currently exist in that state. The private tuition 
observation for Wyoming included in the regression model is the average of the adjacent states' 
private tuition. 
The two-sector regression equation can be expressed as follows. 
SUBSTD - Pa + p, PERPOP18 * pj SCHOOL + ^jPERCAPlN + P^ POPLN + p, URBAN 
+ Pj POPSQMI + p7 LNFUTERN + p, LNFOREGO + P, AVETAXRT + p„ NETMIG 
+ P,j Ol/TSJD + P,i/>KAP572) + Pij JJ7COEMRL + £ 
The regression results for the optimal per-student subsidy for the 50 states are presented in 
Table 4. Parameter estimates, t ratios, adjusted R^ and VIF statistics are stated. Tables IB, 2B, 
3B, and 4B in Appendix B, provide the regression results for the other higher education variables for 
the SO states. 
Empirical Findings 
The purpose of developing the two-sector model was to take into account the 
interdependencies in the higher education markets and therefore have a more realistic analysis. As 
seen in Table 4, the two-sector model regression has a marginally higher adjusted R^ and nine 
significant parameter estimates for the SO states. The parameter estimates are very similar in value 
105 
Table 4. Regression Results for Two^ector Model of Per-Student Subsidies in the 50 States 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values VIF R' = 0.6079 
Adj. R' = 0.4663 
INTERCEF -31782 -1.162 0.00 
PERPOP18 435.53 1.152 1.63 
SCHOOL -345.9 -1.879** 5.63 
PERCAPIN 0.182381 1.696** 4.00 
POPLN 50.28 1.206 2.27 
URBAN -39.454526 -3.067* 3.71 
POPSQMI 1.401882 1.150 3.69 
LNFUTERN 122.92 3.853* 2.00 
LNFOREGO 71.73 3.907* 1.54 
AVETAXRT 485.82 2.761* 1.83 
NETMIG 12.10 1.844** 2.30 
OUTSTD 0.684032 1.963* 2.18 
PVAPSTD -1.453266 -2.235* 2.27 
JUCOENRL 13.92 0.905 1.99 
^Significant at 5 percent. 
''•*Significant at 10 percent. 
and are of the same sign as in the one-sector regression. The major difference is that per capita 
income emerges as significant at the ten percent level. 
The two-sector theory shows that the effect of a change in each of the explanatory variables on 
the optimal public per-student subsidy is ambiguous due to the price terms in the demand equations 
and the treatment of the PVEB curve. Therefore, there are no inconsistencies between the signs of 
the parameter estimates and the theory. The empirical results for the two-sector regression suggest 
the educational attainment, percent urban population, and per-student state appropriations for 
private institutions all negatively influence the optimal state per-student subsidy for public schools. 
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Per capita income, expected future earnings, foregone earnings, average tax rate, nonmigration, and 
outside funding all appear to positively influence the optimal state subsidy for public students. 
Average educational attainment again negatively influences the optimal public per-student 
subsidy and positively affects public enrollment, indicating that the rightward shift in the private 
demand curve for public higher education outweighs the rightward shift in the external benefits 
curve. The parameter estimates for average educational attainment are not significant at the Hve or 
ten percent confidence level for the private tuition and private enrollment regression. 
Per capita income positively influences the optimal subsidy and both public and private tuition. 
This seems to imply that the leftward shifts in the two supply curves hypothesized in the theory are 
of a greater magnitude than the rightward shifts in the two demand curves and the external benefits 
curve. Tuition increases in the two markets combined vnth an increase in the optimal subsidy can 
only occur with a leftward shift in the supply curves, hence, the increase in the optimal per-student 
subsidy in wealthier states appears to be due to increased costs rather than an increased 
commitment to higher education from individuals or the state. 
Population is not significant in the optimal subsidy regression but emerges as significant and 
positive in the two enrollment regressions and the private tuition regression. The positive influence 
on both private tuition and enrollment indicates a rightward shift in the private demand curve for 
private education. 
Urbanization again negatively influences the optimal public subsidy per student. The 
enrollment and tuition regressions shed no light on what is occurring in the two markets. It is 
possible that, as discussed earlier, an increase in urbanization decreases a states' ability to fund 
higher education due to increased demands on their budgets. 
The increase in expected future earnings variable, or the rate of return from investing in 
higher education, positively influences the optimal subsidy and negatively affects both public and 
private tuition levels. This implies again that the rightward shift in PVEB outweighs the rightward 
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shift in the private demand for public education in the public market. The negative impact on 
private tuition brings up the possibility that the private demand curve for private higher education 
shifts left due to the increased state support of public higher education and the subsequent decline in 
public tuition. 
The average tax rate positively affects the per-student subsidy and negatively affects the public 
tuition (at the .1034 level of significance). It is unknown if this is due to the rightward shift in 
PVEB or the leftward shift in the private demand curve for public higher education or a 
combination of both shifts since the enrollment regression is inconclusive. Oddly enough, an 
increase in the average tax rate has a positive effect on private enrollment. This is unexpected since 
it was predicted that the private demand curve for private higher education would shift left with an 
increase in the tax rate. 
The results for an increase in the percentage of college graduates who remain in the state, or 
the migration index, are similar to the previous empkical results. The optimal subsidy is positively 
influenced and public tuition is negatively influenced as predicted. However, public enrollment is 
negatively affected by the migration variable instead of positively as predicted in the theory. These 
results are more consistent with a decrease in the private demand curve for public education than 
with an increase in the external benefits curve. 
Foregone earnings positively influences the optimal per-student subsidy and negatively 
influences public tuition. This is in keeping with the previous conclusion that the leftward shift of 
the demand for public higher education was larger than the leftward shift of the external benefits 
curve. 
Outside money for public institutions again positively affect the per-student subsidy and both 
public and private tuition. As discussed previously, this could be due to a leftward shift in the public 
supply curve rather than the rightward shift predicted in the theory or due to a rightward shift in the 
demand curve for public higher education if outside money is used by students and their families as 
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definitive answer. Tbe positive influence of outside money to public institutions on private tuition is 
possibly due to a feedback effect from the public tuition increase since public tuition positively 
influences the private demand curve for private education. 
State appropriations for private students negatively affects the optimal public per-student 
subsidy and is insignificant in the other higher education regressions. The theory was completely 
ambiguous with respect to all of the higher education variables except public enrollment due to the 
conflicting effects of the shifts in the demand curves and the external benefits curve as well as the 
related secondary effects. 
Junior college enrollment is not significant in the subsidy regression but negatively influences 
public tuition. This result is consistent with the theory which suggested that junior college 
enrollment lowered the public supply curve. The parameter estimate is positive in the public 
enrollment regression but is insigniHcant. Junior college enrollment is also insignificant in both the 
private tuition and enrollment regressions. 
Regression Results Tor the 48 Contiguous States 
The regression results for the 48 states are presented in Table 5. These results are very 
similar to the one-sector results. Nine of the variables are significant at the five or ten percent 
confidence level. Per capita income is insignificant and population and population density are 
significant at the ten and five percent confidence levels respectively in contrast to the SO state, two-
sector results. 
The results for the two-sector regressions on the other higher education variables for the 48 
states are presented in Tables SB through SB in Appendix B. 
As in the one-sector comparison of the SO and 48 state results, some of the parameter 
estimates are dramatically affected by the deletion of Alaska and Hawaii. The parameter estimate 
for the percentage of the population college-aged changes in sign between the two models, but it is 
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Table 5. Regression Results for Two-Sector Model of Per-Student Subsidies in the 48 
Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values 
R' = 0^289 
A4J. R' = 
0J488 
INTERCEP 10615 0.467 
PERP0P18 -230.39 -0.787 
SCHOOL -411.4 -3.018 
PERCAPIN 0.09 1.159 
POPLN 55.74 1.828** 
URBAN -33.07 -3.128* 
POPSQMI 1.95 2.221* 
LNFUTERN 69.01 2.398* 
LNFOREGO 46.56 2.385* 
AVETAXRT 140.95 1.004 
NETMIG 13.75 2.719* 
OUTSTD 0.64 2.479* 
PVAPSTD -0.63 -1.269 
JUCOENRL 20.26 1.752** 
^Significant at 5 percent. 
**Signiricant at 10 percent. 
not significantly different from zero in either case. The difference in the parameter estimates again 
could be because Alaska and Hawaii are outliers or due to multicollinearity. 
Junior college enrollment positively affects the per-student subsidy in the 4S state two-sector 
model just as it did in the 48 state one-sector model. Public tuition is negatively affected by junior 
college enrollment as predicted by the theory. However, it is uncertain if the decreases in the tuition 
levels support an unpredicted increase in the external benefits curve or if it supports the theory. The 
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levels support an unpredicted increase in the external benefits curve or if it supports the theory. The 
enrollment regression results do not shed any light because the parameter estimates for junior 
college enrollment are not significantly different from zero. 
The parameter estimate for population density is positive and significant for the subsidy 
regression and insignificant for the other four higher education variables. As discussed in the one-
sector empirical results in Chapter 5, this supports the external benefits argument for funding higher 
education since one of the theoretical predictions was that the external benefits curve, PVEB, would 
shift right with an increase in population density due to the increased valuation of good neighbors. 
Regression Results for a Reduced Empirical Model 
A reduced empirical model was estimated for the five higher education variables to test the 
sensitivity of the parameters to the deletion of several explanatory variables. The explanatory 
variables that were deleted from the regression equation may be sufficiently correlated with the 
remaining variables to warrant their exclusion. The shortened regression equation for the optimal 
per-student subsidy can be expressed as follows. 
SUBSTD - Po + P, PERPOP18 + Pj £^*^ 4^ /^ + + P 3  P O P L N  +  p^  URBAN 
+ pj LNFUTERN + AVETAXRT + p, NETMIG + Pj OUTSTD + E 
(27) 
Table 6 reports regression results for the optimal per-student subsidy in the SO states using the 
reduced empirical model. The regression results for the remaining four higher education variables 
can be found in Tables 9B through 12B in Appendix B. 
As shown in Table 6, the reduced empirical model for the optimal per-student subsidy in the 
50 states has an adjusted of .2801 and the values of the VIF statistics are lower than in the 
complete model. The empirical results are very similar to the complete empirical model results 
reported in Table 4. The percentage of the population college-aged, per capita income, expected 
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Table 6. Regression Results for Two-Sector Reduced Model of Per-Student Subsidies in the SO 
States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values 
R* = 03977 
Adlj. R' = OJSSOl 
VIF 
INTERCEP -10129 -2.414 0.0 
PERPOP18 665.46 1.835** 1.11 
PERCAPIN .16 1.895** 2.05 
POPLN 24.85 0.605 1.64 
URBAN -25.14 -2.040* 2.53 
LNFUTERN 97.42 3.102* 1.44 
AVETAXRT 317.93 1.759** 1.43 
NETMIG 8.31 1.434** 1.33 
OUTSTD .16 0.514 1.45 
*Signiflcant at 5 percent. 
•^Significant at 10 percent. 
future earnings, and the average tax rate all appear to positively influence the optimal per-student 
subsidy. Urbanization again appears to negatively influence the optimal per-student subsidy. 
The percent of the population college-aged positively influences the optimal per-student 
subsidy and public tuition. The rise in tuition is consistent with a rightward shift in the private 
demand curve for public higher education. The increase in the optimal per-student subsidy is not 
consistent with the initial effects of a rightward shift in the private demand curve for public higher 
education and must be due to feedback effects. 
Per capita income positively influences the optimal per-student subsidy and tuition in both the 
public and private markets for higher education. This implies that the leftward shifts in the two 
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supply curves outweigh the rightward shifts in the demand curves and the external beneHts curve. 
Population positively influences both public and private enrollment and private tuition and is 
insignificant in the optimal subsidy and public tuition regressions. The positive coefficients for 
private tuition and private enrollment indicate that a rightward shift in the private demand for 
private education curve has occurred. 
Urbanization negatively influences the optimal per-student subsidy as before and is 
insignificant in the tuition and enrollment regressions. 
The increase in expected future earnings variable again positively influences the optimal per-
student subsidy and negatively influences public and private tuition. The implication is that the 
rightward shift in PVEB outweighs the rightward shift in the private demand curve for public higher 
education. 
The average tax rate positively influences the optimal per-student subsidy as well as private 
enrollment. The results from the reduced model are similar to the complete model results. 
The reduced empirical model regression results for the 48 contiguous states are reported in 
Table 7. In this regression, only the increase in expected future earnings is significant and positively 
affects the optimal per-student subsidy. The regression results for the other higher education 
variables are reported in Tables 13B through 16B in Appendix B. 
Conclusions 
The two-sector theory was developed to provide a more satisfactory theoretical analysis 
recognizing interdependencies between the private and public markets. The regression results are 
slightly better with the two-sector framework, but the two-sector model does not provide any 
theoretical predictions about the effects of a change in any of the explanatory variables on the 
optimal public per-student subsidy. The advantage of the two-sector theory is that the effects of 
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Table 7. Regression Results for IVo-Sector Reduced Model of Per-Student Subsidies in the 48 
Contiguous States 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values 
R ' s  0 . 1 8 2 6  
A<y. R' = 0.0149 
VIF 
INTERCEP -698.50 -0.194 0.0 
PERPOP18 191.34 0.663 1.08 
PERCAPIN 0.06 0.915 2.18 
POPLN 35.39 1.117 1.65 
URBAN -10.64 -1.057 2.86 
LNFUTERN 57.08 2.280** 1.58 
AVETAXRT 95.86 0.664 1.42 
NETMIG 1.57 0.336 1.19 
OUTSTD .11 0.468 1.36 
•^Significant at 5 percent. 
•"Significant at 10 percent. 
changes in the explanatory variables on the private market tuition and enrollment variables provide 
additional information about what has occurred in the higher education market. 
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CHAPTERS. CONCLUSIONS 
One purpose of this dissertation was to provide a theoretical framework for analyzing 
interstate variation in higher education expenditures. Previous studies of state government 
expenditures on higher education were primarily ad hoc in nature. Two theoretical models were 
developed to generate predictions about the influence of the explanatory variables on the optimal 
per-student subsidy for public higher education. In the empirical analysis, many of the theoretical 
predictions were confirmed, but some characteristics of the data are not explained by the theory 
presented here. 
The most significant empirical finding of this study is that state governments appear to 
respond to the equity interest they have in the education of their citizens. The variables that heavily 
affect the return that states earn from higher education investment are consistently significant in the 
empirical analysis. Increased future earnings, foregone earnings, tax rate and migration influence 
future state government income and thus affect state support of public higher education. 
The empirical analysis also confirms that state support of private institutions decreases 
allocations to public institutions. This result is consistent with the one-sector prediction and 
indicates that public institutions compete with private institutions not only for students but for state 
funding as well. Thus, state support of private colleges and universities is at least partially offset by 
decreased subsidies to public colleges and universities. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table lA. Regression Results for One-Sector Model of Public Tuition in the 50 States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R' = 0.6276 
A4i. R* = 0.4787 
INTERCEP 28728 1.557 
PERPOP18 202.47 0.859 
SCHOOL -0.54 -0.005 
PERCAPIN 0.13 1.991* 
POPLN 14.45 0.542 
URBAN 7.96 0.983 
POPSQMI -0.60 -0.779 
LNFUTERN -59.52 -2.718* 
LNFOREGO -31.56 -2.412* 
AVETAXRT -180.92 -1.652** 
NETMIG -7.90 -1.936** 
OUTSTD 0.53 2.465* 
PVORIENT 5.31 0.505 
PVAPSTD 0.20 0.496 
JUCOENRL -30.38 -3.062* 
^Significant at S percent. 
^^Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 2A. Regression Results for One-Sector Model of Public Enrollment for the 50 States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R* = 0.9749 
A(y, R* = 0.9649 
INTERCEP -1646711 -1.919 
PERPOP18 35830.43 3.269* 
SCHOOL 14372.0 2.684* 
PERCAPIN -3.20 -1.005 
POPLN 30718.00 24.774* 
URBAN -64.04 -0.170 
POPSQMI -1.12 -0.031 
LNFUTERN -837.29 -0.822 
LNFOREGO -393.98 -0.647 
AVETAXRT -3864.13 -0.759 
NETMIG -352.71 -1.857** 
OUTSTD -12,29 -1.219 
PVORIENT -1234.73 -2.528* 
PVAPSTD -8.57 -0.454 
JUCOENRL 241.79 0.524 
•Significant at 5 percent. 
*'Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 3A. Regression Results for One-Sector Model of Public Tuition in the 48 Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Vaiues R* = 0.6638 
A4i. R' = 0J212 
INTERCEP 2%53 1.455 
PERPOP18 366.06 1.476 
SCHOOL 44.61 0.387 
PERCAPIN 0.13 1.952** 
POPLN 8.63 0.328 
URBAN 11.85 1.311 
POPSQMI -0.77 -1.031 
LNFUTERN -64.23 -2.472* 
LNFOREGO -41.07 -2.306* 
AVETAXRT -123.07 -1.039 
NETMIG -10.14 -2.374* 
OUTSTD 0.46 2.106* 
PVORIENT 2.67 0.260 
PVAPSTD 0.10 0.259 
JUCOENRL -29.18 -2.901* 
^Significant at 5 percent. 
••Significant at 10 percent. 
123 
Table 4A. Regression Results for One-Sector Model of Public Enrollment for the 48 Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R* = 0.9770 
Adlj. R* = 0.9673 
INTERCEP -1714121 -1.804 
PERPOP18 43803.77 3.790* 
SCHOOL 16221,6 3.018* 
PERCAPIN -2.90 -0.882 
POPLN 30497.67 24.856* 
URBAN 66.74 0.158 
POPSQMI -8.99 -0.256 
LNFUTERN -884.45 -0.730 
LNFOREGO -693.67 -0.835 
AVETAXRT -755.54 -0.137 
NETMIG -440.94 -2.214* 
OUTSTD -14.79 -1.437 
PVORIENT -1353.61 -2.824* 
PVAPSTD -14.33 -0.730 
JUCOENRL 264.72 0.565 
*Signiflcant at 5 percent. 
**Significant at 10 percent. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table IB. Regression Results for Two<Sector Model of Public Tuition for the 50 States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R* = 0.6249 
Aty. R' = 0.4894 
INTERCEF 32322 1.918 
PERPOP18 209.11 0.898 
SCHOOL -6.22 -0.055 
PERCAPIN 0.14 2.180* 
POPLN 17.57 0.685 
URBAN 8.61 1.087 
POPSQMI -0.52 -0.706 
LNFUTERN -64.20 -3.268* 
LNFOREGO -34.79 -3.078* 
AVETAXRT -181.04 -1.671 
NETMIG -7.90 -1.955** 
OUTSTD 0.53 2.500* 
PVAPSTD 0.18 0.463 
JUCOENRL -31.71 -3.346* 
*Signiflcant at 5 percent. 
**Signiflcant at 10 percent. 
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Table 2B. Regression Results for Two-Sector Model of Public Enrollment for the 50 States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R' = 0.9703 
A^j. R^ = 0.9596 
INTERCEP -2482450 -2.925 
PERPOP18 34286.04 2.922" 
SCHOOL 15693.0 2.747* 
PERCAPIN -5.00 -1.500 
POPLN 29993.63 23.188* 
URBAN -214.05 -0.536 
POPSQMI -17.627 -0.466 
LNFUTERN 250.16 0.253 
LNFOREGO 356.12 0.625 
AVETAXRT -3837.09 -0.703 
NETMIG -353.41 -1.735'"' 
OUTSTD -12.73 -1.177 
PVAPSTD -4.85 -0.241 
JUCOENRL 549.02 1.150 
'Significant at 5 percent. 
* "'Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 3B. Regression Results for the Two-Sector Model of Private Tuition for the SO States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R* = 0.5852 
Adj. R* = 0.4354 
INTERCEP 81775 2.051 
PERPOP18 -262.46 -.476 
SCHOOL -328.1 -1.223 
FERCAPIN 0.34 2.187* 
POPLN 132.62 2.183* 
URBAN 16.21 .865 
POPSQMI .95 .539 
LNFUTERN -137.47 -2.957* 
LNFOREGO -41.18 -1.540 
AVETAXRT -75.35 -.294 
NETMIG 3.85 .403 
OUTSTD .98 1.934** 
PVAPSTD -.19 -.204 
JUCOENRL -14.77 -.659 
*Significant at 5 percent. 
*'Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 4B. Regression Results for the Two-Sector Model of Private Enrollment for the 50 States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R* = 0.7113 
A4|. R' = 0.6071 
INTERCEP 949350 0.937 
PERPOF18 -436.12 -0.031 
SCHOOL -3839.4 -0.563 
PERCAPIN 4.17 1.048 
POPLN 8309.86 5.382* 
URBAN 233.05 0.489 
POPSQMI 2.23 0.049 
LNFUTERN -1263.45 -1.069 
LNFOREGO -666.15 -0.980 
AVETAXRT 13419.93 2.060* 
NETMIG -87.15 -0.359 
OUTSTD -5.53 -0.429 
PVAPSTD 0.93 0.039 
JUCOENRL -503.16 -0.883 
^Significant at 5 percent. 
•^Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 5B. Regression Results for the Two-Sector Model of Public Tuition for the 48 Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R* = 0.6631 
Adj. R' = 05343 
INTERCEP 31458 1.664 
PERPOP18 371.96 1.527 
SCHOOL 42.54 0.375 
PERCAPIN 0.14 2.081* 
POPLN 10.08 0.397 
URBAN 12.24 1.392 
POPSQMI -0.74 -1.015 
LNFUTERN -66.64 -2.783* 
LNFOREGO -42.83 -2.636* 
AVETAXRT -122.23 -1.047 
NETMIG -10.17 -2.417* 
OUTSTD 0.46 2.134* 
PVAPSTD 0.09 0.241 
JUCOENRL -29.81 -3.098* 
*Signiflcant at S percent. 
"•Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 6B. Regression Results for Two-Sector Model of Public Enrollment for the 48 Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R^ = 0.9715 
A^j. R* = 0.9605 
INTERCEP -2627332 -2.679 
PERPOP18 40817.04 3.231* 
SCHOOL 17269.0 2.934* 
PERCAPIN -4.83 -1.370 
POPLN 29764.56 22.610* 
URBAN -128.66 -0.282 
POPSQMI -25.34 -0.666 
LNFUTERN 333.46 0.268 
LNFOREGO 198.30 0.235 
AVETAXRT -1182.63 -0.195 
NETMIG -422.89 -1.936** 
OUTSTD -14.67 -1.298 
PVAPSTD -9.62 -0.448 
JUCOENRL 585.07 1.172 
*Significant at 5 percent. 
** Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 7B. Regression Results for the Two-Sector Model of Private Tuition for the 48 Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Vaiues R^ = 0.6372 
Adj. R* = 0.4985 
INTERCEP 67934 1.570 
PERPOP18 259.11 .465 
SCHOOL -210.10 -.809 
PERCAPIN .36 2.324* 
POPLN 115.79 1.99* 
URBAN 21.78 1.082 
POPSQMI .35 .214 
LNFUTERN -127.09 -2.319* 
LNFOREGO -5039 -1355 
AVETAXRT 142.73 .534 
NETMIG -1.24 -.130 
OUTSTD .84 1.696** 
PVAPSTD -.60 -.635 
JUCOENRL -12.71 -.577 
'Significant at 5 percent. 
'"Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 8B. Regression Results for the Two-Sector Model of Private Enrollment for the 48 Contiguous 
States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R' = 0.7140 
A4j. R' = 0,6047 
INTERCEP 798487 0.670 
PERPOP18 4826.62 0.314 
SCHOOL -2687.0 -0.375 
PERCAPIN 4.39 1.025 
POPLN 8147.39 5.091* 
URBAN 283.23 0.510 
POPSQMI -3.70 -0.080 
LNFUTERN -1140.25 -0.755 
LNFOREGO -742.36 -0.724 
AVETAXRT 15650.58 2.125* 
NETMIG -136.44 -0.514 
OUTSTD -6.81 -0.496 
PVAPSTD -3.32 -0.127 
JUCOENRL -486.48 -0.801 
^Significant at 5 percent. 
**Sigmficant at 10 percent. 
Table 9B. 
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Regression Results for the Reduced Two-Sector Model of Public Tuition for the 50 States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R' - 0J890 
A^j. R' = 0.2698 
INTERCEP -2925.00 -1.099 
PERP0P18 503.81 2.190** 
PERCAPIN 0.12 2.281** 
POPLN 5.73 0.220 
URBAN -6.17 -0.790 
LNFUTERN -46.80 -2.350** 
AVETAXRT -174.27 -1.520 
NETMIG -6.09 -1.657 
OUTSTD 0.43 2.065 
"'Significant at 5 percent. 
**Signiflcant at 10 percent. 
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Table lOB. Regression Results for the Reduced Two-Sector Model of Public Enrollment for the 50 
States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R^ = 0.95 
AdU. RV= 0.94 
INTERCEP 4075.57 0.031 
PERPOP18 6679.46 0.579 
PERCAPIN -3.10 -1.091 
POPLN 30.16 23.067** 
URBAN -30.58 -0.078 
AVETAXRT -2558.99 -0.445 
NETMIG -7.47 -0.041 
OUTSTD 4.64 0.443 
*Signincant at S percent. 
''Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table IIB. Regression Results for the Reduced Two-Sector Model of Private Tuition for the SO 
States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R' = 0.4720 
A4j. R' = 03690 
INTERCEP -2132.24 -0.383 
PERPOP18 457.35 0.951 
PERCAPIN 0.31 2.650** 
POPLN 106.69 1.957" 
URBAN 10,12 0.619 
LNFUTERN -96.73 -2.322** 
AVETAXRT -92.63 -0.386 
NETMIG -3.05 -0.397 
OUTSTD 0.47 1.091 
'Significant at 5 percent. 
••Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 12B. Regression Results for the Reduced IVo-Sector Model of Private Enrollment for the 50 
States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R' = 0.6836 
A4j. R* = 0.6219 
INTERCEP -223095 -1.699 
PERPOP18 10304.39 0.908 
PERCAPIN 3.62 1.297 
POPLN 7987.83 6.214** 
URBAN 13.25 0.034 
LNFUTERN -707.54 -0.720 
AVETAXRT 13205.89 2.336** 
NETMIG -146.58 -0.808 
OUTSTD -11.81 -1.145 
"Significant at 5 percent. 
•"Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 13B. Regression Results for the Reduced Two-Sector Model of Public Tuition for the 48 
Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values RV= 0.4426 
A4j. R' = 03283 
INTERCEP -5691.21 -1.948 
PERPOP18 652.02 2.780** 
PERCAPIN 0.15 2.612** 
POPLN -0.45 -0.018 
URBAN -8.61 -1.051 
LNFUTERN -37.25 -1.831* 
AVETAXRT -98.57 -0.841 
NETMIG -4.86 -1.276 
OUTSTD 0.43 2.139** 
*Signincant at 5 percent. 
'^Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 14B. Regression Results for the Reduced Two-Sector Model of Public Enrollment for the 48 
Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R* = 0.9S10 
A4j. R' = 0.9409 
INTERCEP 29315 0.190 
PERFOP18 5455.76 0.440 
PERCAPIN -3.42 -1.119 
POPLN 30,182.05 22.77** 
URBAN 17.20 0.040 
LNFUTERN -959.03 -0.892 
AVETAXRT -3101.09 -0.501 
NETMIG -29.21 -0.145 
OUTSTD 4.45 0.413 
^Significant at 5 percent. 
'''*Signiricant at 10 percent. 
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Table 15B. Regression Results for the Reduced Two-Sector Model of Private Tuition for the 48 
Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R* = 0.5653 
A4|. R* = 0.4761 
INTERCEP -10295 -1.809 
PERP0P18 906.10 1.984* 
PERCAPIN 0,36 3.266*' 
POPLN 84.54 1.686' 
URBAN 5.22 0.328 
LNFUTERN -71.39 -1.802* 
AVETAXRT 143.95 0.630 
NETMIG -0.36 -0.049 
OUTSTD 0.47 1.198 
'Significant at 5 percent. 
''Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table 16B. Regression Results for the Reduced Two-Sector Model of Private Enrollment for the 48 
Contiguous States. 
Variable Parameter Estimate T-Values R* = 0.6938 
Adj. R' = 0.6310 
INTERCEP -315763 -2.130 
PERPOP18 15342.74 1.289 
PERCAPIN 4.29 1.462 
POPLN 775.55 5.935* 
URBAN -53.63 -0.129 
LNFUTERN -405.86 -0.393 
AVETAXRT 15826.64 2.660* 
NETMIG -111.38 -0.576 
OUTSTD -11.76 -1.137 
*Signiricant at S percent. 
•"Significant at 10 percent. 
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APPENDIX C 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
STUDSUB 4751.88 1404.12 2864.79 11682.10 
PUBPRICE 1903.41 884.11 953.13 5864.43 
PUBENROL 141875.04 158347.03 13046,00 946323.00 
PVTPRICE 6553.64 1989.21 2113.11 10713.88 
PVTENROL 43396.48 60605.56 0 325512.0 
PERPOP18 .109 .004 ,096 .118 
SCHOOL 12.48 .18 12,10 12.8 
PERCAPIN 15571.90 2727.76 11116.00 23059.00 
POPLN 4911.00 5307.09 479,00 28314.00 
URBAN 63.80 21.96 20.00 100.00 
POPSQMI 164.04 231.19 1.00 1034.00 
LNFUTERN .241 .065 .105 .352 
LNFOREGO 8.92 .099 8.73 9.20 
AVETAXRT 0.088 .011 .067 .125 
NETMIG 1.06 .33 .56 2.21 
OUTSTD 2326.61 621.68 1424.92 4181.26 
PVORIENT .210 .132 0 .600 
PVAPSTD 313.07 339.70 0 1184.26 
JUCOENRL .306 .134 0 .577 
